After policies mainly aimed at cutting back social expenditure in the 1980s, the 1990s have witnessed an increasing focus on more ‘qualitatively’ oriented policies. In recent years central fields of intervention have been: the activation and re-integration of unemployed people, the promotion of equal opportunities for men and women and the reconciliation of work and care tasks, the facilitation of flexible work and improving the social protection of flexible workers, and the execution of benefit and re-integration schemes.

In this report we will discuss developments in Dutch social protection as they took place in the two year period of 1999 and 2000. We will follow the focus points set out by the Commission’s specifications for the report, and add to it the issue of the execution of benefit and activation schemes, since in the Netherlands this was among the main topics in the period at hand.

Basically, rather few important policy changes have occurred since the end of 1998. Most of what was newly implemented is the result of policy plans that were set out earlier, and quite some proposals for change still have to be implemented in future. The 1999 European Employment Guidelines have not explicitly started developments in Dutch social policies, but have well stimulated them.

For the general and historical background of the policy issues discussed here we refer to the Dutch report of last year, in which we elaborated quite extensively on these matters.

In the beginning of the 1990s, the Dutch government has chosen to implement a more active labour market approach towards beneficiaries. The main focus is on ‘work, work, work’, by providing different types of additional jobs in the public and private sector. Since 1 January 1999, based on the EU Employment Guidelines, the so-called ‘comprehensive approach’ has been introduced as a new focus on activation. Unemployed people who apply for benefit will be offered a full ‘reintegration plan’ which aims for either paid work or a social activation alternative within 12 months. Social activation consists of non paid activities benefiting the community.

The I/D-jobs (or Inflow/Outflow jobs) are a renewed type of additional jobs, which is introduced in 1999. They are aimed at unemployed people who are not expected to be able to find a regular, paid job in short time. Most participants are long-term (>1 year) unemployed. Since 2000, the government tries to fill in ten percent of the jobs with disabled people, and outflow opportunities have been extended to more qualified jobs, which latter should provide an easier outflow towards regular paid labour. The fully subsidised jobs are provided in the public sector. Examples are city guards, supervisors in public areas (such as museums, playgrounds etc.) and other jobs that provide in the public’s demand for safety and supervision in everyday life. After five years the unemployed participants are expected to be able to find a job at their own effort. The program is a success, which is why the number of I/D-jobs will be extended from 45.000 in 1999 to 60.000 in 2002 (TK 00/01, 27402, nr. 1-2, p. 35).

Despite I/D some unemployed people still have little chance of finding paid or even subsidised jobs. Social assistance claimants (Abw) in those cases can participate in social activation programs. Unemployed people with an unemployment insurance benefit could not. This has been changed, however, in 1999 with the introduction of the Law on Experiments in the Unemployment Act (Wet Experimenten WW, TK 98/99, 26394, nr. 3), which is an outcome of the Dutch National Employment Action Plan (TK 97/98, 26024, nr. 10). The act provides a temporary relief (maximum duration of an experiment is 4 years) for certain specified duties, such as the duty to apply for jobs. By doing this, a more flexible and intensive program can be started to try to decrease the gap between work and unemployment for long-term unemployed (who form about 55% of the WW-population). A major part of the experiments will focus on schooling and training. Experiments will be thoroughly monitored to find ‘best practices’.

Many unemployed people are confronted with the poverty trap when accepting work. Especially those who find jobs at the minimum wage may sometimes even end up with income from work that is lower than their previous benefit. This means that a benefit can financially be more attractive than a paid job, which of course contradicts emphasis on activation towards paid labour. In order to tackle this problem, to make work pay, a major step will be taken in 2001 with the introduction of the new taxation system in the Netherlands. This system introduces a tax credit for all employees, and especially for unemployed people and women.

The objective of the ‘work tax deduction’ [arbeidskorting]is making work financially more attractive. It will be in the form of an earned income tax credit and comes down to an extra tax free sum. The credit is mainly meant for people with low incomes and decreases with wage level. It has the most impact on people with benefit, who accept a job at minimum wage level.

Another way of making work pay is to individualise the tax system. At present it is possible to transfer a personal tax-free sum from one working partner to the other, in case the partner’s income does not exceed a certain level. When the partner wants to work more hours in order to increase the wage, this could lead to a situation in which the duty-free sum is not transmittable anymore. This could lead to a decline in total household income, because the partner with the highest wage has to pay an extra tax that is higher than the rise of the net income of the partner with the lowest income. This could be a reason for the partner with the lowest wage not to work more hours. The existing system can also refrain non-working partners from working at all. In the new system, in which personal tax free sums are not transmittable, these effects on labour market participation will not occur (TK 98/99, 26727, nr.3).

Furthermore, in order to meet the goal of making work pay there will also be lower charges in the income tax generally and there will be lower taxes for employers. Through this government aims to decrease the gap between gross and net incomes. At the same time indirect taxes (VAT/ btw) will be raised from 17.5% to 19% (TK 98/99, 26727, nr.3).

In the period at hand very little has changed in the field of long term unemployment compensation, minimum incomes and social assistance schemes, unemployment and disability insurance schemes, housing benefit, pensions etc. In other words, the benefit component as such of the system of social protection has changed little.

Two things can be mentioned her.

One new act has been introduced: the Law on Income Provision of Artists (TK 97/98, 25053, nr. 3). It provides artists with an income lower than the General Social Assistance, but it also exempts an artist from the work obligation. Furthermore, it allows an artist to earn up to 125% of the standard assistance payment, without being cut on benefit. This right lasts for four years in ten. An artist is a person who has completed a full curriculum at a certified institute of arts.

Second, restrictions have been implemented for people entitled to receive benefit in the Netherlands but who (go to) live abroad. The Export Restrictions on Benefit Act specifies that entitlement to Dutch benefits will be reserved for people living in the Netherlands only. Any person entitled to claim benefit under national insurance schemes, workers insurances or social assistance loses entitlement if he or she takes up residence in a country other than the Netherlands for a period longer than three months. As soon as that person takes up residence in the Netherlands again he or she will basically be entitled to claim benefit again. By introducing this act government aims at bringing in line the enforcement policy for benefits within and outside the Netherlands. A benefit can be exported to a country which has signed a treaty with the Netherlands, i.e. has entered into a contract that contains valid provisions for enforcement. Benefits can also be exported to countries within the European Union.

After the pension reforms of 1998, maximising the future national pension (AOW) contribution at 16.5% of wages and installing the AOW Savings Fund, no changes have taken place in the field of pensions.

In recent years no major changes in health care have occurred. There are however some trends in health care policy focusing. Health care used to focus on controlling the demand for care, e.g. by budgeting hospitals and doctors. The system of demand control was implemented in the 1980s in a period of recession, when the expenditures on health care had to be diminished. However, in the 1990s the demand for health care increased strongly, especially because of demographic changes, and people are nowadays better informed and know what they want. Health care has to adjust to this new situation and become more patient oriented instead of a orientated towards bureaucratic control (Dillmann & Sanders, 2000). This trend asks for investigation and new policy in the very near future. This will presumably lead to more market-led incentives, deregulation, a more local approach and a new financing model in which the health care provisions are central.

In 1985, the Dutch Emancipation Council formulated as a major goal for future policymaking: ‘the achievement of a situation in which every individual, regardless of his or her household situation, can provide for his or her own income’ (TK 84/85, 19052, nr. 3). According to the council, this goal was mainly to be achieved by increasing labour participation, by facilitating the way to paid work. From that moment on, combining work and care was a major policy challenge.

The main focus was on increasing the labour participation of women, which was very low in the Netherlands. Extension of child day care facilities, and implementing maternity and parental leave measures were among the early policies. In the mid 1990s, the focus on combining work and care was broadened. Not only should women be encouraged to increase their labour participation, the promotion of combining work and care should focus more on men. In the end, a situation should be created in which in every 2-person household both parents take equally care of working and caring. This does not only serve emancipation goals, as stated in several European Employment Guidelines, but it complies with personal needs too. More and more individuals approve a lifestyle in which they can combine several other activities with their main profession, such as care for the sick, schooling and voluntary work. Dutch government stated that it wants to provide a Work and Care Act which supplies sufficient means for people to combine work and care.

The Work and Care Act is a framework combining several existing and proposed measures that are all aimed at facilitating the combination of work and care tasks for employees. Self-employed are mostly excluded from this act, since they are expected to take proper arrangements for themselves (TK 99/00, 27207, nr. 3, p. 10).

The Parental Leave Act (Wet Ouderschapsverlof), established in 1991, gives both parents the right to a period of six months unpaid, part-time leave, which can be taken until the children reach the age of four. This Act is considered as a minimum. Collective agreements or individual firms can supplement to this (den Dulk, 1999). In 1997 the constraints of this Act were relaxed; parents with children under eight years of age also qualify and the minimum number of working hours is abolished (SCP,1998). In March 1999 maternity leave was enlarged. Women are now entitled to 16 weeks, instead of 12 weeks, of a fully paid maternity leave. However, employees did not have a formal right to pregnancy leave and delivery leave (zwangerschaps- en bevallingsverlof). At present this right is formalised.

Government observes a growing need among employees to interrupt their career for a certain period of time. The 1998 Career Breaks Funding Act (Wet Financiering Loopbaanonderbreking) provides for an allowance, subject to certain conditions, for employees who agree with their employer to take long-term leave for reasons of care or education. Note that this means that this is not a formal right to care-leave, but a facilitation of it. The Act is designed to encourage people to take leave for care and study purposes. The requirement, that an unemployed person on benefit should replace the person taking leave, makes it an activation tool as well. Most of the existing leave-arrangements are unpaid now. Especially men are reluctant to take a leave (especially long-term leave). If the leave period is paid, one of the most important hindrances to take the leave will be removed. Besides Career Breaks for care and study, a break can be taken by employees who take care of a terminally ill person at their home. In such a case the maximum duration of the leave is six months and the requirement that an unemployed person should replace the employee is not applicable.

In 1999, the Act on Adaptation of Labour Hours (Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur) has been implemented. This act introduces an individual right to change ones working hours, either downward or upward. If an employee has worked for an employer for a year, he or she can apply to work more or fewer hours once every two years. The employer must discuss the application with the employee and ultimately grant it, unless it conflicts clearly with important company interests (to be proved by the employer). This act contains several advantages. First of all, it more than meets the criteria that are mentioned in the EU-guideline on part-time work (97/81/EG). Secondly, by providing more part-time work government meets preferences of many household members for working less in order to spent more time on non-working activities, such as caring tasks. The act can possibly result in 70.000 extra jobs of 38 hours per week because of the expected partial drawback from the labourmarket by many fulltime workers who will choose to work less hours (TK 98/99, 26358, nr. 3, p. 13).

In the near future, a right to calamity-leave should enable employees to take a short break during working time to take care of certain urgent (family-)matters without losing pay. For example, in case of a defected waterworks or a suddenly sick child the employee should have the opportunity to take some emergency measures. A legal right to leave in such circumstances is still lacking, but a right to leave with a maximum of ten days per year is in preparation. The employers interest will have to be taken into consideration. Government considers partial income support as important, but leaves it to social partners to agree on this. Government takes responsibility for stimulating conditions in fiscal and social insurance law.

In addition to the calamity leave right, a leave right for caring for sick household members is in preparation. A fulltime worker will be allowed to take 10 days paid leave per year if caring is necessary. A maximum of two days can be devoted for the father after the birth of a child. In case of a multiple birth this period will be enlarged proportionally. The amount of wage paid during the leave will be the same as for sick employees: 70% of the wage. If the company can prove that it is absolutely not in the company's interest to take the care-leave, it may be rejected.

A legal fiscal frame is in preparation to encourage saving for periods of leave (verlofsparen) in favour of interrupting the career. The proposed arrangement offers a possibility to shift maximally 10 percent of the current wage to a future point of time. The maximum duration of the leave is 12 months (TK 98/99, 26447, nr. 3).

Parents who have adopted a child may also feel the need to take a short career break in order to give time to the 'bonding' to the new household member. Both parents will have the right to a maximum of three weeks paid leave. This will also be paid to self-employed.

As with leave arrangements, public childcare is very limited in the Netherlands, although increasingly childcare is seen as the shared responsibility of parents, government and employers. Especially in a time in which more and more workers prefer to combine caring and working, childcare is a vital condition. Municipalities are responsible for the expansion and administration of the childcare. During the beginning of the nineties central government stimulated the increase in the number of child-care facilities by providing subsidies. Organisations could hire places in subsidised child-care centres. The Stimulation Measure on Childcare has increased the number of childcare places but there is still need for more places. In 1995 only 7,5% of children under four had a place in public childcare. After-school care for children is even more limited; 0,84% of children (den Dulk, 1999). To stimulate an increase in (company) childcare places government has introduced a tax deduction for parents and employers who make use or create childcare places has been established (Niphuis-Nell, 1997). The European Commission is still working on a VAT dispensation for childcare (TK 26447, 1998-1999). Besides these existing measures the new Dutch taxation system will provide a tax deduction for day care centres (to a certain level). Child care for children up to 13 years will be deductible for parents. The maximum deduction is Î 8.645,- .

Government wants to modify vacation legislation. An employee should be able to save vacation days for a longer period. This period is now limited to 2 years and should be changed into 5 years. This would enable employees to interrupt their normal work for longer periods.

Next to the demand for possibilities to combine work and care, there is a trend that more and more employees work on a more flexible basis, e.g. as a means to be able to combine work and care. Also employers increasingly prefer to hire flexible workers in order to be able to respond faster to changes in demand. Flexible work has increased in the Netherlands throughout the 1990s (SCP, 1998). Together with growing flexibility a need for improving the social protection of flexible workers is felt. In 1999 the Flexibility and Security Act was implemented. Clearly, this act does not just take care of social security rights for ‘flexible’ workers, which in most cases are women. It does give rules for more security for them while they are working, but it tries to find the right balance between security and flexibility: security of work, income and job protection for the employee on the one hand, and flexibility for the employer on the other. In other words: flexicurity. This facilitates the employability of flexible workers, who were sometimes unprotected and therefore a very vulnerable group of workers. The Act contains several subjects, which will be described below (TK 96/97, 25263, nr.3).

If someone is working for an employer, it might be unclear whether this can be described as a contract of employment or not. This is however relevant for establishing social security rights. Situations are unclear especially if the duration of labour is very unstable, or short (For example in those cases where there is little or no description of the number of hours to work). Before 1999 there were no clear rules on this matter, except for some vague guidelines that caused much uncertainty in practice. The Flexibility and Security Act states that if someone has been working three months with a minimum of 20 hours a months, there is a contract of employment. If the employer thinks differently on this matter he has to prove this. This rule implies that a contract of employment can still be defined differently, but the starting point is 20 hours a month in three months.

Some employees have so called ‘on-call’ contracts. The problem with this is that it might lead to situations in which someone will have to show up, taking time and effort, without having to work very long. To compensate for this, every time the employee is called for, the employer has to pay at least three hours, regardless of the fact whether the employer has worked less hours or not. Comparable rules already exist in Germany and Belgium. There are two clear situations to establish whether this rule is applicable or not: the first situation is when the duties agreed take 14 hours or less a week and there is no agreement on when these hours will be worked. Secondly, this rule is applicable if the duration of the working activities have not been agreed on (clearly). So for example, if the employer and employee agree that the employee works 1 hour every day from 14.00h to 15.00h, he will get paid for only 1 hour each day. If this situation occurs without clear preceding agreement, this person gets paid 3 hours a day per call.

An employee will only get paid for if he actually carries out his work. If he does not fulfil his duties, the employer has the right not to pay salary. There is one exception to this rule: if the reason of not being able to work can be attributed to the employer (with ‘fair’ reasons), than the employee still keeps his right on salary. This might occur, for example, if the employer forgets to open his shop on time, and the employee is waiting in front of a closed door. This rule is by itself nothing new, it already existed for years. It was, however, possible to exclude employees from this right by making individual agreements on this matter. The Flexibility and Security Act still allows this exclusion, but with a maximum duration of the first six months of employment. After this period, exclusion is only possible if agreed by collective agreement between employer and labour union.

Probationary period

Before an employer decides whether or not to hire a new employee, he may decide to make use of a probationary period. There used to be a maximum duration of two months. For labour contracts that only last for a short time (e.g. one year), these two months were disproportionally high. Therefore the new law decided that for shorter contracts a shorter maximum duration will be introduced. A contract of less than two years, or a temporary contract with an undefined or unpredictable ending (e.g. for incidental projects) can only have a maximum probationary period of one month. The duration of this period can be enlarged by collective agreement between employer and labour union, with a maximum of (totally) two months.

A contract of employment for a defined period usually ends because the maximum time that has been agreed upon between employer and employee expires. These temporary contracts offer the employer a way of filling in temporary demand for labour. One problem for employers with temporary contracts was that, if they wanted to lengthen the contract (but still keep it as a temporary contract), the possibility of firing the temporary worker became much more difficult. This conflicts with the wish for flexibility. This situation also forces employers to choose between two extreme options: either enlarging the contract (and thereby making it a permanent job), or losing a good worker because it is undesirable to enlarge the contract. The employee, on the other hand, will find himself a hard time getting security from a temporary contract. He might be working for different employers as long as a permanent worker for one employer, but still be much weaker if one regards his right to prevent dismissal. The Act on Flexibility and Security tries to enlarge the possibilities and rights for both the employer and employee in situations of what is called in Dutch schakelarbeid or linked-labour, i.e. several temporary contracts following one another. The act provides the possibility to have three successive contracts of employment after which the contract between employer and employee ends without need for permission by authorities (court (kantonrechter) or the Regional Manager of the District Labour Office). These three (maximum) contracts can only last for (maximum) 36 months. If the contracts exceeds this period of 36 months they are considered to total up to a contract without a specified ending, i.e. a permanent contract. In that case, permission by authorities is needed to end the contract. There might be a situation in which there is a gap between the periods of employment. Only if this gap is not larger than three months, the separate contracts will be added up as stated above. If there is a larger gap, the contracts will be regarded as unconnected with each other. Another point is the case of a contract with a defined ending that lasts at least 36 months, but is enlarged after that. The above says that in that case it should be seen as a permanent contract, because the two contracts add up to more than 36 months. If, however, the enlargement is at most three months, it is still not regarded as a permanent contract. This exception has been made for projects that take just a little more time than expected. Than there is another issue. How to deal with situations in which different employers can be observed as ‘following up’ each other? For example: someone works for A with a year-contract, after which he gets transferred to a different employer B. B, however, is part of the same organisation. In this case A and B are seen to be the same and therefore the contracts will be ‘added up’. In case of working for C after A, if C is a completely different employer (e.g. the competitor of A), no contracts are added up. Finally, if in the first period the employee has worked for a temporary work agency at a certain company and then gets a contract at the same company (but without intervention of the temporary work agency), the contracts will be added up too. Exceptions to these rules can be made only by collective agreement between employers and labour unions.

Temporary employment agencies fill in a big demand for temporary workers by taking care of administration and recruitment of temporary workers. More and more people find jobs by way of these agencies. They seem to be working very effectively, but more clarity on the rights of temporary workers is needed. Specifically, for a long time there has been uncertainty about the relation between agency and worker. Should this be seen as an employer-employee relation at all or as a temporary situation? The Flexibility and Security act gives a straight answer: after 26 weeks the relation is seen as an employer-employee relation in which the agency has a formal labour contract relation with the employee. It is possible to differ from this rule if collective agreement can be reached. This has already been done by the Dutch social partners in April 1996. In this year, they formulated a covenant for temporary workers that will be valid for five years, starting together with the Security and Flexibility Act on 1 January 1999 (Janssens, 1998). The starting point of the covenant is that the longer someone works for the same temporary work agency, the stronger the bond between agency and worker will be. We will make the covenant rules clear by using an example. First of all, there is the employee A, who works for the temporary work agency B. Employer C is looking for a temporary worker and asks for the help of B. B asks A to work for C and if A accepts this offer, A starts to work in phase I. Note that legally A is working for B: the agency. Phase I lasts for 26 weeks and nothing is different than before 1999. This phase is ‘unprotected’, i.e. if C does not want to make use of A anymore, or if A does not want to work anymore, the process stops. Every week in which work for B has been done by A is counted as a week. If there is a gap between the weeks that lasts for more than a year, than the counting of the weeks starts again. After 26 counted weeks of work phase II starts. This period is again practically ‘unprotected’, just as phase I. This lasts for six months. If there is a gap between two working periods within this phase that lasts longer than three months, counting in phase II starts again (as if A just started to work in phase II). If this gap lasts for more than a year, A will be put back in phase I. After 26 weeks phase I and 6 months phase II A enters phase III. In this phase, that lasts 6 months if A continues to work for C, or 24 months in case of working for several others than C (e.g. if employer D, E, F and G also ask B for temporary workers), A has a right for work for three months. If there is no work during this period, he gets paid anyway. After not having worked three months, A starts again at the beginning of phase III. If A has not worked for a full year, he will be put back all the way to phase I. After this phase III, A will be put in phase IV, which gives him or her a permanent contract. If there is no work, A will be paid anyway. In this case, B will have to provide for work for A. So in this phase IV there is a contract of employment between A and B. The temporary worker works as any ‘normal’ employee for employer B, who happens to be a temporary work agency.

This is a very fundamental change compared to the situation before 1999. One of the main advantages for an employer is the fact that he can hire a temporary worker (via a temporary work agency) as long as he wants. He has no obligation to hire this worker himself permanently. That obligation occurs in phase IV for the agency B, not for the employer C. For the employee, this means that he will have more security for work and income. After a certain period, he gets a ‘normal’ job with all advantages (like getting paid when there is no work or in case of sickness).

As with any contract, a labour contract can be ended in certain circumstances. This might be because of reasons of personal misbehaviour of the employee (e.g. steeling) or employer (e.g. sexual assault), financial reasons (e.g. business is bankrupt), etc. Ending the contract cannot be done without permission by the authorities. In the Dutch case this means that the employer has to go to court (kantonrechter) or to the Regional Manager of the Labour Office. The most common procedure is called cancellation. Ending the contract in another way will be discussed in the next paragraph. This cancellation-procedure, however, was time-consuming and thereby caused irritation among all parties. Therefore, the Flexibility and Security Act introduces some changes. First of all, the period of notice for the employer and employee has been changed. This period is one month during the first five years of employment. Every next five years, this period will be enlarged by one month. Maximum duration is, however, four months. For the employee who wants to quit, the period of notice is at least one month. There is a possibility to agree on a longer period of notice, which can be maximally six months. In that case, the period of notice for the employer must be no shorter than twice the period of notice that counts for the employee. Secondly, the rules for dismissal have, administratively, changed. The period for the Labour Office to work on a request for dismissal has been shortened to a desired (no guarantee can be given in case of complicated dismissals) maximum of four to five weeks (which was six weeks). Also, in case of collective dismissal, the waiting period of one month, that existed before 1999, has been removed. Also, if dismissal is requested, and after this request the employee gets sick, this will have no impact on the dismissal procedure. Before 1999, sickness usually inflicted long waiting, because a permission for dismissal would not have been given. The Dutch Unemployment Act (WW) includes a statement that says that if the unemployment due to dismissal is culpable (i.e. the employee is unemployed because of his own (mis)behaviour), no benefit will be granted. This meant, however, that for every dismissal the employee had to make a note of protest against his dismissal (otherwise he could be judged culpable and not be granted benefit). In several occasions, this protest was just for form’s sake. In the Flexibility and Security Act, no protest by the employee is needed anymore if dismissal is due to economic reasons. Finally, if both employee and employer decide to end their contract, no approval by the Labour Office is needed anymore. This is to facilitate a situation in which protection for the employee is seen to be unnecessary because both parties insist on ending the contract. If the contract is ended by cancellation, the new act states that notification of this fact has to be done written if the employee asks for that.

If the contract of labour is ended differently than has been described before, no period of notice is needed. This might occur in case of a termination of the labour contract with approval of both parties, or if the termination has been approved in court. In this case, the right to unemployment insurance will occur earlier than if there would have been a period of notice. It might, however, also occur that for a certain period the former employee still receives money from his former employer as a way of compensation. This income has no influence on the acquiring of WW, because the WW lacks a means test. This implies that the former employee will get ‘double pay’. Former employees who do, on the other hand, have a period of notice do not have this accumulation of rights. They only get their insurance benefit after the period of notice. This situation is seen to be inequitable by government. Therefore, they decided to introduce a fictitious period of notice. Only after this period is ended, (s)he will be granted benefit. During this fictitious period of notice, the former employee will still be insured for sickness and disability to work. The duration of this period is as long as the duration would have been if the contract was ended by normal procedure of ‘cancellation’.

In the period under consideration no changes took place in social protection funding.

Traditionally the delivery of unemployment assistance and unemployment insurance are separated. Assistance is administered by the municipal social services, insurance benefits by semi-public social security agencies (Uitvoeringsinstelling: Uvi: established in 1995). Re-integration (training, advice, job-brokerage etc.) is delivered by public regional labour offices. In future these three actors are more closely interconnected, and there will be a new division of public and private tasks. The main aim of this change in the structure of execution of benefit and activation measures is to improve re-integration effectiveness.

Government issued a plan in January 2000, with says that the five uvi’s will be centralised into one public, national Administrative Body for Workers Insurances (Uitvoeringsorgaan Werknemersverzekeringen UWV). Social partners are completely left out at this level of practice. Re-integration will be in future be realised through newly established CWI Centres for Work and Income, who will buy ‘integration services’ from private companies. In these Centres municipal social services, centralised uvi’s and labour offices will co-operate offering one-shop service to all unemployed and disabled people claiming benefit. The future structure of the administration of Dutch unemployment insurance and re-integration will then be as follows.

Council for Work and Income RWI

The Council for Work and Income (Raad voor Werk en Inkomen RWI) analyses developments in the field of social security, labour market and re-integration, and advises the Ministry of Social Affairs on adequate policies each year. It develops criteria for the distribution of re-integration budgets, assesses new re-integration projects, and pays out re-integration subsidies. The Council will be composed of representatives of social partners and municipalities, and will have an independent chair.

Administrative Body for Workers Insurances UWV

The Administrative Body for Workers Insurances (Uitvoeringsorgaan Werknemers-verzekeringen UWV) executes the workers insurances. It collects premiums, assesses claims and pays out benefits. It is responsible also for the re-integration of unemployed people. On demand of social partners UWV is allowed to do the administration of supplemental, occupational schemes. The UWV is a public body, with a management team and a governing board of independent experts.

Municipal social services administer social assistance, and the re-integration of their clients.

National Institute for Work and Income LIWI

The National Institute for Work and Income (Nationaal Instituut voor Werk en Inkomen LIWI) governs and controls the regional Centres for Work and Income (CWI’s). It advises the Ministry of Social Affairs on the administrative aspects of new policies. Like the UWV the LIWI is a public body, with a management team and a governing board of independent experts.

Centers of Work and Income (CWI)

The Centres for Work and Income (Centra voor Werk en Inkomen CWI) will be the first entry to the benefit and re-integration systems and schemes for all unemployed workers, social assistance claimants and other unemployed people. The CWI assesses claims for benefit and measures ‘distance to the labour market’. Clients with a very short distance (i.e. who have no particular deficiencies, and have good chances on the labour market), will be -re-integrated’ by the CWI. For all others individual re-integration plans will be set up, and clients will be ‘handed over’ to the UWV (in case of unemployed entitled to unemployment insurance) or the municipal social service (those entitled to unemployment assistance) for payment of benefit and implementation of the re-integration plan. The latter will for the largest part be ‘bought’ by UWV and social services from private re-integration companies.

It will be promoted that social services, UWV, and private companies will have personnel available in the CWI office. The CWI takes over certain functions of the regional labour offices, mainly those regarding advice and support for unemployed people. The actual brokerage activities of the labour offices will be privatised.

The establishment of Regional Platforms will be promoted, in which municipalities, re-integration companies, the CWI, the UWV and social partners can meet and discuss relevant topics, co-ordinate activities and joined projects, increase accessibility of job markets etc.

The Social Security Supervisory Board (College toezicht sociale verzekeringen, Ctsv) will police the adequacy and effectiveness of the delivery of insurance schemes by LIWI, CWI’s and UWV. Social assistance is policed by the Ministry of Social affairs. The latest proposal of government is to abolish Ctsv and to transfer its task to the Ministry.

Summarising:

- The delivery of Dutch unemployment benefits will become more centralised.

- The role of social partners is diminished.

- At the administrative level the system of benefits is made fully public, the system of re-integration fully private.

- The systems of benefits and re-integration services are integrated at the policy and client level.

- At the client level ‘one-stop’ Centres for Work and Income are established.

- At the policy level a Council for Work and Income will be installed.

- The municipal social service will remain to have a central task in the administration of social assistance benefits and the re-integration of its clients. It will be connected to the CWI’s, who will do the intake of clients, and set up individual re-integration plans.

- The re-integration of unemployed people is one of the booming businesses in the Netherlands. The LIWI sells re-integration contracts through public auctions.

In general changes in Dutch social protection can mainly be seen as promoting the labour participation of all citizens. This policy seems to be very much in line with the first European employment guideline on improving employability. Employability is also encouraged by the demand to review and adapt benefit, tax and training systems to ensure that they actively support employability. Social partners are urged to increase the possibilities to promote employability. Easing the transition from school to work and promoting a labour market open to all are also ways to increase employment. The second employment guideline, which is on developing entrepreneurship, seems to be a rather neglected part of Dutch social policy. Although some experiments are set up, especially for foreigners, entrepreneurship still does not seem to be a very common way to tackle unemployment. A larger emphasis is put on the third theme of the European employment guidelines, which is on encouraging adaptability of businesses and their employees. In order to accomplish this the Dutch government stimulates organisations to modernise their work organisation and support adaptability in enterprises by re-examining the obstacles to invest in human resources. The final theme, which is on strengthening the policies for equal opportunities between women and men, seems to be the most vital and present applied employment guideline besides the guideline on improving employability. Dutch social policy tries to promote a gender mainstreaming approach, by tackling gender gaps, reconciling work and family life and facilitating reintegration into the labour market.

Furthermore, three items still need more attention of the Dutch government in order to meet the European employment guidelines. The first is to extend the ‘comprehensive approach’ for people who need jobexperience and training before they can make a re-entry into the labour market. The aim is to meet the European employment guidelines on offering unemployed adults a fresh start before reaching 12 months of unemployment, in the form of training, retraining, work practice, a job or other employability measure. Although a lot of planning on this has been done, the comprehensive approach needs to be put in practice. The second is to intensify the already existing labour market policy and to make executional organisations (uitvoeringsorganisaties) more focused on reintegration. In the third place there is attention for the position of specific target groups like ethnic minorities (by trying to stimulate their participation into the labour market), older employees (to encourage them not go on early retirement by adapting human resources policies for older employees) and women with caring responsibilities. Because there is still no equal distribution of work and care between men and women, the Government wants to improve the possibilities to combine work and care as well.

Also, some reports and articles have been published lately on some aspects of recent Dutch social policy, which will now be discussed. These reports are mainly focused on the Work and Care Act. The Act on Adaptation of Labour Hours has only been implemented for a couple of months (since July 2000). Nevertheless, researchers from Tilburg (Fouarge et al., 2000) have estimated that the number of employees that would like to work more hours is less than half the number of employees who would like to work less hours. This will lead to an estimated decrease of hours worked of 58,000 full-time jobs. The researchers note that this number will probably be larger if – within a short period of time – no facilities for working more hours (e.g. child day care) will be provided. At the moment, it is also highly questionable whether these hours can be used for providing jobs for unemployed. Most of them cannot work because of medical, caring or household reasons, or do not want to work full-time, and they cannot make use of this Act until one year of labour. This would imply that the shortage of workers, which is already present in the Netherlands, will only increase. A major positive aspect, on the other hand, is expected because working less working hours will probably reduce the labour burden for older employees, thereby reducing the inflow into the sickness and disability benefits.

The Career Breaks (Funding) Act has been evaluated by researchers in Rotterdam (Van de Aa et al., 2000). The Act, implemented in October 1998, has a very low take-up. Only 217 employees took a leave, that was supported by this Act. Although it can be expected that this number will rise in the near future (because the Act is gaining publicity), it will probably not reach 56,000, the number of employees that has been expected by the Government. A ‘typical’ user of this act is 45 years old, female, and has been working for the same company for more than seven years. Most ‘leavers’ work part-time, are highly educated, and have relatively high salaries. Most leavers (60%) do not take the financial stimulus of the Government in consideration when deciding whether or not to take a leave. They mostly depend on their partners income. On the employer-side, it turns out that most employers who sustain the application for a leave are (semi)government institutions. On the whole, employers and employees are positive about the Act. It can, however, be questioned how positive this Act has been if only such a small group of employees makes use of it. To diminish this non take-up, the researchers suggest that more promotion should be given to the Act. Also, the financial support is seen to be too low for most employees to make it a serious consideration. Finally, the obligation to find replacement is a very tough condition for the users of this Act.

Although the Work and Care Act has not been implemented in full, some preliminary reports have been written about the present situation on combining work and care. The Dutch Inspection on Labour (2000) had performed a very wide ranging research under 90% of all the collective labour market agreements. The agreements that include a clause on childcare facilities have risen, but clauses on care-leave have stabilised. This implies that the need for the Work and Care Act is still very high, according to the Secretary of State. Another research on the behaviour of households towards work and care (Grift et al., 1999) suggests that labour participation decisions are mainly taken on the basis of the own income, and hardly on the partners income. This would suggest a first step towards economic independency of men and women. The introduction of young children in the household does, however, still turn the number of hours worked for women down whereas for men this has hardly any influence. On the other hand, men and women seem to invest more time in unpaid work, mainly for childcare. If in the future the childcare facilities will broaden, this will mostly lead to an larger labour participation of women. All in all the researchers are positive about the results, and they expect more positive results if the Work and Care Act will provide a good supporting framework for combining work and care.

In 2000, the Parental Leave Act, established in 1991, has been evaluated (Grootscholte et al., 2000). It seems that still a large majority (78%) of all entitled to the Act ‘simply’ do not want to take a career break when they have children. People who do take a parental leave are mainly highly educated, have a high income and work part-time. A main reason to leave is the want to spend more time with their children. This seems to be the most vital incentive. Besides time, money also turns out to be influential. Especially the ‘non-takers’ are unwilling to take a leave because of the financial consequences. A third reason, which is according to the researchers less influential, is the availability of sufficient and qualitatively good child (day) care. In other words, time and money seem to be the most vital incentives for parents in their decision whether or not to give up their job temporarily for their children. The report also focusses on the effects after the leave. It turns out that leavers want to work less hours after they return to the labour market. Especially women tend to choose for a part-time job. Remarkably, the same effect can be seen for non-leavers; they also prefer to work less hours after the birth of their child

Finally, the Flexibility and Security Act has been evaluated for the second time (the first can be found in our previous report). It seems that the longer the Act has been implemented, the more positive results can be found (De Klaver et al., 2000). About 217,000 temporary contracts were changed into permanent ones. 86,000 temporary contracts were ended. In the previous evaluation, these numbers were respectively 80,000 and 45,000. Also, if in a collective labour market agreement consensus can be found about changing the clausules of the Act, this is allowed. This has been done in practice in about 33% of the collective labour market agreements. The Flexibility and Security Act is getting more and more known in the Netherlands, although promotion still seems necessary. The Secretary of State claims that the Act does not lead to unwanted side-effects of the working of the labour market. The researchers, on the other hand, suggest that this might be more due to the prosperous economic climate in the Netherlands than due to the Act. They claim that the great demand for workers make their overall-position better, which includes the position of flexible workers. Employers have a hard time finding and keeping their employees to work for them, which makes it unlikely that they will try to loose their flexworkers so easily.

On the whole, it seems that the evaluations are quite positive on the recent political developments. We would, however, like to refer to our last report, in which we also made some critical remarks, in order to demonstrate some shortcomings of the social security system that have not been solved yet. At first, three groups with notoriously bad labour market chances, older unemployed, women and ethnic minorities, are still absent as explicit target groups for activation measures. We would like to add the beneficiaries of the Act on Disability Insurance (WAO) to this list. Although they are an explicit target group, the rising number of beneficiaries would suggest a highly ineffective approach. The government still seems completely incapable to stop the ‘Dutch disease’ of more than 1,000,000 people who have a disability benefit (WAO, WAZ, WAJONG).

Secondly, problems in health care have still not been solved either. Long waiting lists are still a common practice for a lot of patients. Although the economic prosperity would suggest more room for tackling this problem, more and more patients find themselves on long waiting lists for surgery and other medical operations. Some political parties describe this as the ‘de-civilisation of the Netherlands’.

Finally, the emphasis on the ‘participation neurosis’, which points to the fact that working in itself is stressed by government as a most valuable thing in life, is still very vivid, or even more vivid than as we described in our previous report. All recent policy issues and proposals are aimed at an increasing labour participation. One might say that the Work and Care Act is, on the other hand, aimed at reducing the working hours. This Act is, however, only meant for people who are already working as an employee. Furthermore, it is highly doubtful whether the participation neurosis has had any major effect on labour participation for the target group of the (long-term) unemployed. It seems that only 25% of all new jobs were filled in by social security beneficiaries (SCP 2000). The rest were ‘taken’ by newcomers on the labour market. The growth of jobs seems thus to be a ‘Dutch miracle’ for highly educated and young potentials, but a ‘Dutch nightmare’ for long-term, old or disabled beneficiaries.

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