1.1: Dutch (un)employment developments

1.2: Policy background

1.3: Recent activation measures: WIW, I/D, SAMEN, WIK, REA, Comprehensive Approach

1.3.1: WIW

1.3.2: I/D

1.3.3: SAMEN

1.3.4: WIK

1.3.5: REA

1.3.6: Comprehensive Approach

2.1: Patterns of work and care

2.2: Policy background

2.3: Recent (proposed) measures

3.1: Numbers of beneficiaries

3.2: Policy background

3.3: Recent measures:

3.3.1: Unemployment (WW)

3.3.2: Disability (PEMBA/WAZ/WAJONG/WSW)

3.3.3: Social assistance (ABW)

3.3.4: Pensions

4.1: Figures on temporary, part-time and flexible work

4.2: Policy background

4.3: Recent measures: Flexibility and Security Act

6.1: Introduction

6.2: Recent (proposed) measures

Focus points and structure of the report

The restructuring of the Dutch welfare state dates back to the early 1980s (see e.g. Van Oorschot 1998). Developments since the beginning of the 1998s revolve mainly around the major issues of ‘activation’, ‘combining work and care’ and the execution of benefit and reintegration schemes. Another, ongoing, focus point has been social security schemes, under which various issues were at stake. Furthermore, measures have been directed at the ‘flexibilisation of the labour system’ and at healthcare.

The term of activation encompasses those policy measures that are aimed at reducing the inflow of people into social security benefits, as well as at promoting their outflow out of it. In The Netherlands the term is used interchangeably with terms like re-integration, re-insertion and participation of unemployed people. The emphasis on activation originated in the mid 1980s, as a reaction to the then high level of (long-term) unemployment. It became the core of Dutch socio-economic policy in the early 1990s in which period a large number of measures were taken. From 1998 onwards concrete measures aimed specifically at the activation of long-term unemployed and disability benefit claimants. Recently activation policy was given a boost by the Luxembourg Employment Summit, the Treaty of Amsterdam and the European Employment Guidelines. A National Employment Action Plan 1999 has been issued by the Dutch Government, in which it presents (intended) measures for dealing with the Guidelines. The new so-called ‘comprehensive approach’ is directly linked to this.

To promote equal chances for and treatment of men and women, as well as for utilising the full potential of the Dutch labour force government is developing a series of measures aimed at facilitating people to combine work and care. A first Work and Care framework law is under construction, while a number of measures have already been implemented.

In the ongoing process of social security reform recent measures have been taken, mainly regarding disability benefit aimed at increasing employers’ responsibility for contributions and benefits paid, and regarding the national pension scheme in response to the ageing of the Dutch population. Unemployment insurance and assistance were not subjected to major changes recently. Re-integration/activation of beneficiaries is much more central to the social policy debate at present, than the benefit system itself.

The particularly high level of flexible and part-time work among the Dutch working population urges for measures improving the social protection of flex-workers. Stimulating possibilities for flexible work-patterns is also seen as a way of meeting employers’ needs for flexible production and service delivery. The Flexibility and Security Act has been implemented for these purposes.

Since the issuing of a highly critical parliamentary commission’s report on the execution of the Dutch social security system the subject has remained high on the political agenda and a series of measures have been proposed and/or taken. Most recently policy focusses on the Centre’s for Work and Income, in which benefit assessment and activation of beneficiaries should be combined, and on the privatisation of social security executive bodies.

Most of the recent measures taken in the health care sector relate to administration and implementation. Some measures were taken that might directly affect the costs and quality of care for consumers. The most important measures dealt with the problem of the lengthy waiting lists for care services and with opening the possibility for separate treatment of sick employees in public health care institutions.

In this report we will discuss these six topics separately. Each chapter starts with a brief section on figures and developments, followed by one sketching a broader policy background, and ending with a core section in which actual recent measures are described. At the end of the report a critical evaluation of the major measures taken in the period 1998 till present is presented.

THE FIGHT AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT

In the first oil-crisis of around 1973 unemployment started to rise from about 50.000 to 200.000. A number denoted as ‘unacceptable’ by the then government. As a result of the second oil-crisis of 1979 unemployment figures tripled within a few years, from about 200.000 in 1978 to more than 600.000 in 1982. Two years later an all time high was reached at more than 800.000 people. From then the numbers dropped gradually, but a third economic crisis in the beginning of the 1990s resulted in a rise again. In the last few years the number of unemployed decreases again significantly.

Throughout the years unemployment concentrated in specific groups. Unemployment rates have been higher than average for women, young people, ethnic minorities and people with a lower educational level. In 1997, for instance, the overall unemployment rate was 6.4%, but among women it was 9.1%, 10.1% among those between 15 and 24 years of age, 16% among ethnic minorities and 14% among people with only primary school.

From 1970 till present employment has risen permanently in the Netherlands, with the exception of the recession years of the 1980s. A steep rise in job growth occurs after it and manifests the ‘Dutch job-machine’ or ‘Dutch miracle’ (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). The ‘miracle’ has not resulted in vanishing unemployment, however, because the labour force grew even quicker than the number of jobs. For a large part this is due to the massive growth in female labour market participation, which started by the end of the 1970s, stabilised in the beginning of the 1980s, but accelerated after the major economic crisis. The male labour force increased with 20% between 1970 and 1997, the female labour force with 125% (SCP 1998). In the same period the participation rate of men dropped from around 80% to 74%, while participation by women grew from about 20% to 47% (SZW 1998). Overall participation increased in this period from 50% to 65%.

In recent years the Dutch labour market has become more flexible (table 1: see also chapter 5): the proportion of part-time employment increased, among men and women, as well as the proportion of temporary jobs.

The strong rise in labour participation of women mainly consists of part time jobs. Among couples the modern work pattern is one of ‘one-and-a-half job’, the man working (nearly) full time, the women part time. Finally, as a whole the numbers of hours worked annually decreased gradually from 1724 hours in 1973 and 1530 hours in 1983 to 1372 hours in 1996, which is the lowest in Europe (OECD Employment Outlook 1997). According to some this single fact has contributed substantially to the success of the Dutch jobs-machine (SCP 1998), next to the structural low-wage policy of government and social partners.

To conclude, the main Dutch (un)employment trends of the last decades are: 1) structural long-term unemployment, 2) escape of older workers (disability, early retirement), 3) strong increase in female labour participation, 4) strong job growth in the last decade, and 5) flexibilisation of labour (part time and temporary jobs).

Dutch policies aimed at the activation and reintegration of unemployed people started to develop as a reaction to growing unemployment in the 1970s and, especially, the early 1980s. Despite the economic revival and large employment growth in the second half of the 1990s, activation is still high on the social policy agenda, for long-term unemployment has not declined substantially among older unemployed, the low-skilled, single parents and ethnic minorities, and the number of partly disabled unemployed is still very high.

Over the years a permanent and substantial element of the Dutch approach to employment and participation has been the policy of wage moderation, aimed at keeping wage costs down. It was and still is seen as a main macro economic condition for stimulating labour demand.

Since the beginning of the 1990s emphasis was put on policies aimed at influencing qualifications of unemployed, and behaviour and motivations of employees and employers. An incentives approach, based on a rational conception of men, evolved into a central position. A variety of financial incentives were created to stimulate unemployed and disabled workers to find and accept jobs, in the profit as well as non-profit sector. Many of these measures are directed at employers, trying to stimulate them to employ long-term unemployed and disabled workers and to create jobs at lower wage and skill levels. Indirect incentives were created through an increase in the ‘work-relatedness’ of benefit eligibility and entitlement criteria. An enforcing and disciplining approach to participation and activation of unemployed people has never been strong in the Netherlands, but was strengthened in the 1990s through new legislation on sanctioning unemployed who do not comply with work obligation rules (see van Oorschot and Engelfriet 1999 for a review of policies and measures in the period 1980-2000).

Those activation measures that were administered by the municipal social services for young and long-term unemployed have been integrated in the Jobseekers’ Re-employment Act WIW of 1.1.98. It incorporates e.g. the Youth Work Guarantee scheme JWG and Banenpool.

Various measures aimed at the re-insertion of disabled workers and unemployed were integrated in the Act on the Reintegration of Disabled Persons (REA) of 1.7.98.

The reasons for integration of measures in WIW and REA are various. There was overlap between some of the existing measures, competition even, clients and administrations had difficulties in distinguishing between the various conditions and target groups, and there was lack of overall co-ordination.

I/D extends the coverage of Melkert-I jobs.

SAMEN aims at stimulating employers to employ people from ethnic minorities.

WIK offers a subsistence benefit for artists.

The Comprehensive Approach is introduced in 1999 to meet the Unemployment Guideline 2 regarding offering unemployed adults a new start before reaching twelve months of unemployment.

The problem of long-term and youth unemployment is the subject of special measures since 1989 (Banenpool, JWG, Melkert jobs) and the core of the WIW, which integrated a number of such measures.

In 1989 the Experiment Additional Labour (Experiment Additionele Arbeid- EAA) was introduced for long-term (i.e. >three years) unemployed. Around 600 additional jobs were created by the government. In 1990 the EAA was replaced by the Banenpool, which also offered additional jobs for long-term (i.e. > three years) unemployed, to approximately 23.000 people, who could thereby gain working experience. In contrast to EAA, which only gave temporary (1.5 years) jobs, the Banenpool was a semi-permanent appointment. One main problem of the Banenpool was the reward, which was only minimum wage, thereby not offering a big incentive to accept the additional jobs (SCP 1992). The main goal of the Banenpool was to lead people to the ‘normal’ labour market by giving them working experience. This was another problem. Figures from the Ministry of Social Affairs (1998) show that only around 8 percent of Banenpool participants were able to leave the Banenpool and got a regular job. In 1998 the Banenpool was taken into the WIW, the Jobseekers Re-employement Act (Wet inschakeling werkzoekenden - WIW).

For tackling the problem of young unemployed the Temporary Provision on Local Employment Initiatives for Youth (Tijdelijke Voorziening Gemeentelijke Werkgelegenheidsinitiatieven voor jongeren - TV-GWJ) was introduced in 1989. It offered additional jobs for unemployed under 21 years. Around 7.000 youngsters joined this temporary experiment (Van Oorschot and Engelfriet, 1999). Since 1992 this idea was more fully taken over by the Youth Work Guarantee Scheme (Jeugdwerkgarantieplan - JWG), which offered a comprehensive approach to all young unemployed. This means that the state guarantees that for every young (<21 years and school leavers <27 years) unemployed person a job is being offered. Around 25,000 people had a job in the JWG. In contrast to the Banenpool, JWG-jobs were not permanent, but lasted for a maximum of two years. The outflow to regular jobs was larger in the JWG than was in the Banenpool (SCP, 1996): around 30 percent of the participants found a regular job after participating in the JWG. In 1998 the JWG was also taken into the WIW.

In 1994 the new Dutch government put a big focus on creating labour by stating that their main goal would be ‘work, work, work’. One of the results of this ‘approach’ was the creation of thousands of additional jobs, called ‘Melkert-jobs’, after the Minister of Social Affairs, Ad Melkert. In 1996 more than 65,000 unemployed were employed in one of the four Melkert-projects (Van Oorschot and Engelfriet, 1999).

Melkert I-jobs were created in the public sector (safety, supervision, child care, etc.) as 40,000 permanent jobs. Melkert II-jobs were created (20,000 in total) in the private sector and offered additional jobs. Melkert III-jobs (around 7,500) were used as experiments for ‘social activation’. This means that the outflow to regular work was not the main goal. The idea was that for people without good prospects for a paid job experiments were introduced to stimulate them to take part in social and cultural activities, mainly in the form of voluntary work. Melkert IV-jobs (4,000) were jobs in the cleaning business. To drive back ‘moonlight-work’ in this sector, cheap legal jobs were offered to individual households. Melkert II and III jobs were taken into the WIW in 1998.

In 1998 the WIW was introduced as a more integrated measure of activation policies. The problem for local authorities was that there were so many different policies with so many different goals. The WIW tries to facilitate the combination of the use of different activation measures at once, thereby enlarging the possibilities of finding a job. The WIW is no longer restricted to long-term or young unemployed, but meant for all unemployed who need a ‘hand’ by finding a job (TK 1996-1997, 25122).

The number of measures of the WIW is on principle unlimited. Although the law mentions several measures, the municipality is free to take other actions that aim at re-integration of unemployed. The idea is that local authorities have a better view on local possibilities and restraints, and therefore they should be given the opportunity to form their own policies.

Condition for the obtainment of government subsidy is that all WIW based projects lead to the entrance to the labour market or, if that seems impossible at first, to activities that are socially desirable. The local communities have much freedom in filling in this aim, but there is an obligation to co-operate with regional job centres.

The main part of the WIW is WIW-employment. These are additional jobs which create a employer-employee relationship between the municipality and the unemployed person. The main goal is finally the outflow to regular work. If this cannot be done, then activities that give the unemployed person and society useful extras, in terms of participation and useful services, are seen to be fulfilling the goals of the WIW.

A job that is seen as WIW-employment is a 32-hours-a-week-job. Payment is at the minimum wage. The maximum duration is four years. After this period, the unemployed person will qualify for social activation. To ensure that all the created jobs are additional, some criteria are mentioned in the new act. For example, WIW-employment should not replace positions of former employees that have recently been fired.

One element of the WIW-employment is JWG. The difference with the JWG before 1998 is that there is a simplification of rules and more budget. Every JWG-job comes with a ‘contract’ that states the duties and rights of both parties (unemployed and municipality). Also, there is more focus on schooling and outflow to regular jobs. Only young unemployed up to the age of 23 are allowed to JWG under WIW.

It gives youngsters a ‘comprehensive approach’ (see further on), which has to be fulfilled within six months, according to Pillar I of the Dutch 1999 Employment Guidelines. A joint plan is drawn up, at the time of registration, with every young person, with the aim of guiding that person towards the labour market. If this goal has not been fulfilled, even after 12 months, the person is offered employment in return of the minimum wage by the government.

The National Employment Action Plan 1999 of the Netherlands stresses the success of the approach in the WIW towards youngsters in the ‘best practices’-section. This is, among other reasons, due to the fact that the focus is on local determinants, strict plan-making between the two parties and opportunities to tailor the path that has to be taken especially for an individual.

Another part of WIW-employment is Banenpool. The difference with the Banenpool before 1998 is that it is no longer necessary to be unemployed for 3 years. If it is felt that Banenpool is the best way to find a new job, any unemployed can get into this program. The number of Banenpool-jobs has been extended since 1998, to shorten the long waiting lists. There is also introduced a possibility to gain a salary up to 120% of the minimum wage, which makes the employment more attractive. Finally, just as in the JWG, there is a bigger focus on schooling and outflow.

Melkert-II and Melkert-III are now also seen as WIW-employment. There are no big policy changes, except for the name: WIW-employment.

The second part of the WIW is the Work experience-jobs. The difference with WIW-employment is that there is no employer-employee relationship between the unemployed person and the municipality, but between the unemployed person and a private employer. There is a minimum duration of six months, after which the intention is to keep the job at the same employer as a regular job. The private employer receives subsidy for the WIW Work experience-job.

The third part of the WIW is schooling. Several already existing schooling programs can be financed by WIW-subsidy. This is the first goal. If there is no adequate schooling or training available, then a new program might be set up, but this is not seen as very desirable, since the number of schooling possibilities is already very large. Another possibility is the combination of work and learning, or vocational training of young people.

The fourth part contains several other possibilities, such as day care subsidies for unemployed persons to facilitate the combination of work and raising children. Municipalities can design their own policies in this field.

A final part of the WIW is the incentive-budget. This is meant as a positive (‘carrot’) incentive which can be received by an unemployed person if one accepts a job, or if one finishes schooling. The maximum of this one-off-subsidy is Dfl. 2100,=. Besides that, the newly employed worker might get an bonus of max. Dfl. 3240,= a year in order to prevent poverty trap-effects.

Melkert-I has not been incorporated in the WIW, because Melkert-I jobs do not have a direct aim at getting a paid, regular job, which is necessary under WIW. The success of the Melkert-I jobs is, however, big enough too continue the program. In 1999, the Dutch government decided to enlarge the number of participant from 40,000 to 60,000 and to rename the program into I/D-jobs, which stands for Inflow/Outflow (Instroom/Doorstroom)-jobs. This indicates that there is a final aim at outflow to regular jobs under Melkert-I too, but only after five years of being in Melkert-I it is possible to qualify for an ‘outflow’-job. Until the year 2000 the I/D-jobs will continue to exist as a separate means of activation besides WIW.

The I/D-jobs (Van Oorschot and Engelfriet, 1999) are permanent jobs for long-term (>1 year) unemployed persons in the non-profit sector. The jobs are fully subsidised. Examples are city-guards, supervisors in public areas (museums, playgrounds, etc.) and several other useful jobs that provide in a public demand for more safety and supervision in everyday life.

Unemployment among ethnic minorities has always been disproportionally large. Few effective measures, however, have been taken. ‘Positive discrimination’ of ethnic minorities is not at all popular among employers, nor among the public (van Oorschot 1998).

A first step was the introduction of the Law on promoting equal labour participation of ethnic minorities (WBEAA) in 1994. In this act, employers were obliged to inform about the number of employees they had that belonged to an ethnic minority group. Also, they should make clear how they would work on the realisation of a larger proportion of ethnic minorities in their company. This measure lacked sufficient support by employers (who did not work along), due to administrative troubles and an alleged lack of participation in establishing the law.

It was replaced by the Law on Stimulation of labour participation of ethnic minorities (SAMEN) in 1998 (TK 1996-1997, 25369). This law states that all employers have to register the number of ethnic minorities in their company. Furthermore, they must report to the Regional Office for Laboursupply (RBA) on the measures they are going to take in order to gain employment for ethnic minorities in their companies. Sanctions (WBEAA was executed under criminal law; SAMEN is executed under civil law) are less severe than was the case in WBEAA. Furthermore, there is more participation (especially for the works council) for employers in the implementation of this act. By doing this, the legislator hopes he will gain more support for SAMEN and theryby enlarging the proportion of ethnic minorities in the working population.

As mentioned in the National Employment Action Plan 1999 of the Netherlands, the Dutch government has introduced an act for artists - Law on Income Provision of Artists (TK 1997-1998, 25053) - in 1999. This law provides a lower income than the General Social Assistance Act (Abw), but it also gives the right to an artist not to be obliged to apply for jobs and not to accept suitable work. Furthermore, an artist can earn up to 125% of the standard assistance payment applicable to him/her, without being cut on benefit. This right lasts for four years in ten years. An artist is a person who has completed a full course at a certified institute of arts.

In relation to the revision of the Disability Benefits Act WAO in 1987 the Act on Work for Disabled Workers (WAGW) was introduced as the first major re-integration act in the Netherlands. It acknowledges and starts from the strongly reduced labour-market chances for disabled people due to the growth of general unemployment in the 1980s and the increased numbers of disabled workers, c.q. AAW/WAO-beneficiaries. Under the WAGW employers and unions were given the responsibility to take measures to stimulate the (re-)integration of disabled workers. When after some time it would show that their measures were insufficient a quotum, of 3% to 7%, could be imposed on a (part of) an industrial branch. The WAGW has never been seriously implemented, since the proportion of disabled workers in companies did not increase, and a quotum has not been imposed on any branch. It is generally felt that the act was used as a ‘sweetener’ for the reforms of the WAO-in the 1980s.

In order to realise a more effective reintegration policy the Act on the Reintegration of Disabled Persons REA replaced the WAGW in 1998. It contains several new incentives for employers and employees. Like the WAGW it functions as a comprehensive legal framework for measures aimed at stimulating employers, employees and administrative bodies to promote the (re-)integration of disabled people. Government expresses as its view that there is not so much a lack of reintegration measures, but of results. It acknowledges that this might have to do with measures, taken e.g. with regard to short-term disability, that induce employers to avoid employing workers with health problems. Therefore, it introduces with REA that employers get a fixed budget (Dfl. 24 000,=, which will be paid in three parts during the first three years of employment) in case a job is offered to a disabled person. From this budget the employer is expected to pay the necessary workplace adaptations and access improvements. If costs are less than the budget the surplus does not have to be re-imbursed. If costs exceed the budget an extra amount is possible. Furthermore, under REA the sickness pay for an employed disabled person will be paid from the national sickness fund, in stead of by the employer, so that the possible extra sickness risk will not burden the wage cost. The employer can get a reduction on his WAO-contributions if 5% or more of his wages is paid to disabled employees. Furthermore, it is regulated that disabled beneficiaries older than 45 years who accept a job and therewith lose their WAO benefits, regain their old benefit rights, if they get disabled again within five years. With regard to access to REA government is taking quite an explicit point of view: REA sets the conditions, it is up to employers and disabled persons to make use of it.

There is a trend to give the disabled person and the employer more responsibilities. As for the first, with the introduction of REA an experiment started to give the disabled persons an individual budget. They can use this budget to buy services for their own reintegration. The experiment will be evaluated after two years. As for the second, during the first year the employer, supported by the arbo-dienst of his choice, is primarily responsible for the reintegration of his disabled employees. After that the social security execution agency takes over this responsibility. Especially if it concerns the reintegration by the former employer. If that reintegration is not successful, the public labour office becomes involved in the reintegration process too.

The social security execution agencies do not have much power to influence the process of reintegration during the first year of illness. In this period the employer has to draw up and possibly implement a plan for the re-integration of the sick employee. Even after the first year they do not have many possibilities as they have to contract out that task to the labour offices. Since 1998 80 per cent of the reintegration is done by these offices. Furthermore, the agencies and the labour offices have proved to be slow starters as far as reintegration is concerned (Ctsv 1998). However, when the phase of disability starts, there are other possibilities to influence the number of disabled people. For example, it shows that stronger control on medical advisors and labour experts (if they declare claimants totally disabled) influence their decisions. It seems that such control of the ’gatekeepers’ leads to less employees being declared disabled (Ctsv 1998).

Now that we have summarised the new measures aimed at activation and reintegration since 1998, it is time to take a look into future policy-making. Several new actions are going to be taken in order to facilitate the outflow to labour and to prevent the inflow in unemployment. Examples are the reorganisation and restructuring of the intake of unemployed in a one-office-approach (CWI, which will be discussed later in chapter 5), the facilitation of combining work with (child)care (see chapter 2) and the so-called ‘comprehensive approach’ (sluitende aanpak).

The comprehensive approach (which has already been implemented for young people since 1992 in the JWG) has been formulated to meet the EU Unemployment Guideline 2 regarding offering unemployed adults a new start before reaching twelve months of unemployment. At the moment of applying for an unemployment benefit, the unemployed person should be offered a job, a Work experience-job or schooling within twelve months. This is to ensure that no-one gets ‘used to’ receiving a benefit. The forthcoming CWI’s (see chapter 5) are going to facilitate the comprehensive approach. It has been estimated that 265,000 persons per year will have to be helped in this way. Services needed and offered depend on an unemployed’s ‘distance to the labour market’. In this respect 4 categories are used by all Dutch reintegration and activation organisations:

Phase 1 unemployed: The person in question can be helped directly. No (or hardly any) guidance is needed. Therefore this person is not included in the comprehensive approach.

Phase 2 unemployed: The chances of finding a job must be improved. The job-seeker is regarded as being suitable for the labour market within one year, providing targeted job guidance instruments are deployed

Phase 3 unemployed: This person’s distance from the labour market is so large that at least one year of training and schooling is needed to make the person in question employable on the labour market.

Phase 4 unemployed: These people are temporarily not available for work because their distance from the labour market is too great. These people are initially in need of care of assistance, or of a route aimed at social activation, i.e. at stimulating them to take part in unpaid social activities.

Youngsters are excluded from the table because a comprehensive approach already exists for them under WIW (youth work guarantee program).For disabled unemployed the comprehensive approach already exists too in the framework of REA.

The Dutch government has stated that in 2002 this comprehensive approach must be fully implemented for all new unemployed applying for a benefit.

To facilitate this comprehensive approach further, the Unemployment Insurance Experience Act (Wet Experimenten WW, TK 1998-1999, 26394) has recently been introduced in the summer of 1999. It aims at giving extra subsidies to unemployed on an insurance benefit, for activities undertaken by them aimed at their reintegration. All kinds of experiments are going to be subsidised if they can improve the outflow into the labour market. One could compare this measure with Melkert-III-jobs, which also gives subsidy to experiments. The big difference with this measure is, besides group of participants (unemployed with an insurance benefit vs unemployed with a social assistance benefit), that Melkert-III has not such a strong emphasis on outflow towards paid labour.

This new act is especially aimed at long-term (>1 year) unemployed (mostly phase 2 and 3, but, if possible, also phase 4) beneficiaries of the Unemployment Act (WW). In 1997 they formed 54,5% of all WW-receivers (TK 1998-1999, 26394). It must, however, be stated that the official target is the whole group of WW-beneficiaries, no matter how long they receive WW. Traditional ways of reinsertion to the labour market are seen to be insufficient, and therefore subsidies will be given if this might lead to a faster outflow. If an experiment is authorized, if might be possible to differ from official rules, like the obligation to apply for jobs. Maximum duration of the experiments is four years.

Some other proposals that are mentioned in the National Employment Action Plan 1999 are the increase of active measures to improve the employability of unemployed people (by education, training, etc.) and a reform of the tax system (providing tax incentives for workers, employers and unemployed, like a tax credit, reduction of all tax rates, etc.).

The labour participation of women in the Netherlands has grown over the period 1985-1998 and is still growing. More women are on the labour market. As a consequence a growing number of workers have to combine their work with family responsibilities and caring tasks.

Employers, employees and government are forced to find a new equilibrium between labour, care and economic independence.

In the last decade the time-spending pattern of men and women has grown closer to one another, but there are still large differences (table 2.1).

Nowadays more women are working; in 1975 on average they worked 8 hours per week, in 1995 this is already 12 hours per week. The number of working hours for men has not changed dramatically (In 1975 they worked 29 hours and in 1995 they worked 30 hours). In 1975 women spend 36 hours per week to unpaid work. In 1995 this was reduced to 31 hours. At the same time, in 1975, men spend 13 hours per week to unpaid work. In 1995 this has grown to 17 hours per week.

The developments in the last decades point out that both men and women have changed their behaviour pattern. Nowadays women spend more time to paid labour and less time to unpaid work. Men spend more time to unpaid work and about the same amount of time to paid labour. So, the total working time (paid and unpaid) for men has remarkably grown. For women the total working time has almost been fixed.

The development to a more equal division between men and women is visible but moves slow (TK 26447, 1998-1999).

Women, who have children under the age of 21 spend relatively much time to unpaid work, often don?t have a paid job and if they work, they work less hours than women who live together without children.

Women, who have young children, work less in a paid job. Women with no children but cohabiting work approximately 25 hours per week. The difference, between women with or without children, is disappearing slowly. At the same time the total time working in a paid job is increasing for both groups (TK 26447, 1998-1999)

All in all there is a massive growth in female labour market participation, which started by the end of the 1970s, stabilised in the beginning of the 1980s, but accelerated after the major economic crisis. The male labour force increased with 20% between 1970 and 1997, the female labour force with 125% (SCP, 1998). In the same period the participation rate of men dropped from around 80% to 74%, while participation by women grew from about 20% to 47% (SZW, 1998). Table 1.1 in chapter 1 shows that women are grossly over-represented in temporary and part-time jobs.

Householdtypes

During the eighties and nineties the number of one breadwinner-households declined, the number of dual-earners increased (table 2.3).Task-combination within the household is now the mode of living, instead of task- specialisation as it is in one-breadwinner households (SCP, 1998). As a consequence more people have to combine labour and domestic tasks.

The Parental Leave Act (Wet Ouderschapsverlof), established in 1991, gives both parents the right to a period of six months unpaid, part-time leave, which can be taken until the children reach the age of four. This Act is considered as a minimum. Collective agreements or individual firms can supplement (den Dulk, 1999). In 1997 the constraints of this Act were relaxed; parents with children under 8 also qualify and the minimum number of working hours is abolished (SCP,1998).

The past couple of years other measures were taken. E.g., in March 1990 maternity leave was enlarged. Women are from this date entitled to 16 weeks, instead of 12 weeks, of a fully paid maternity leave.

In 1995, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment instructed a committee to consider possible future developments of the division of paid and unpaid work. Their goal was to develop redistribution scenarios for the future. One of these scenarios was the combinationscenario. This scenario was and still is an inspiration source for future government policy. The starting point is to realise paid and unpaid labour in the manner that the person desires. In this scenario the redistribution of unpaid care labour is the responsibility of the society; not only for the persons who have to deal with this problem (Commissie Toekomstscenario’s, 1995) This scenario aims at a more equal distribution of work and care between men and women.

As with leave arrangements, public childcare is very limited in the Netherlands, although increasingly childcare is seen as the shared responsibility of parents, government and employers. The municipalities are responsible for the expansion and administration of the childcare. During the beginning of the nineties central government stimulated the increase in the number of child-care facilities by providing subsidies. Organisations could hire places in subsidized child-care centres. The stimulation measure (1990-1995) on childcare has increased the number of childcare places but there is still need for more places. During this period approximately 1300 million guilders were laid out to increase the capacity of child-care places. But the supply still cannot fulfill the demand. In 1995 only 7,5% of children under four had a place in public childcare. After-school care for children is even more limited; 0,84% of these children had a childcare place (den Dulk, 1999).

Since January 1996 municipalities have the freedom to decide if they use the subsidy for childcare facilities or to another goal. Also the amount of subsidy is decreased in 1996 (Niphuis-Nell, 1997).

To stimulate an increase in (company) childcare places the government has introduced fiscal measures in the nineties; a tax deduction for parents and employers who make use or create childcare places has been established (Niphuis-Nell, 1997). The European Commission is still working on a VAT dispensation for childcare (TK 26447, 1998-1999).

The Working Time Act (Arbeidstijdenwet), established in 1995, supplies more possibilities to flexibilise working hours. One of the goals of this Act is to improve the circumstances to combine care responsibilities with paid labour. The employer is obliged to take reasonable into account the personal circumstances of the employee when he determines the working hours. But the law gives employees few means to refuse a change in working hours when this hinders to combine care and labour. Furthermore there are special arrangements for pregnant women and women who breast-feed their child (TK 24332, 1994-1995).

Given de policy background just sketched, showing that relatively little has been done thus far for meeting the trends in work and care discussed in section 2.1, government now strongly feels a need of better measures for stimulating men and women to combine work and care in a flexible way. It has proposed in the coalition-agreement a new Work and Care Act (Kaderwet Arbeid en Zorg). This Act should combine and co-ordinate all existing leave-schemes and should make them more flexible. This new Act will be based upon existing and new acts. The government calls this Act a growth-Act, which will be established in little parts at a time.

The coalition agreement mentions the right to change one’s working hours; rights to short-term care leave in emergencies and a system of leave to take care of sick relatives. Subject to certain conditions there will also be a concession on savings for leave.

The envisaged Work and Care Act should promote labour participation by means of making it easier to combine work with caring tasks.

The various existing and proposed measures will now be discussed. In the end all these measures should be implemented in the New Work and Care Act, to be realised in three stages.

STAGE I

In 1999 the government proposed a new Act to adapt working hours. This act must be integrated in the new framework act. Since the framework Act is not in practice the working hours act will, for the time being, be an independent Act.

Part-time labour can establish a more equal distribution of labour and care tasks between men and women, which is seen as desirable. Also organisations want more flexibility. Part-time work can assist a company’s wish for more labour flexibility. In the present labour market employers will sooner grant the employees desire for more flexible working hours. Parttime labour is also necessary to increase the labour supply. After all Dutch society is ageing. In short, more flexible working hours/patterns will meet the interests of both employers and employees.

The Act Adaptation Labour Hours (Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur) introduces an individual claused right to change one’s working hours, either downward or upward. If an employee has worked for his employer for a year, he can apply to work more or fewer hours once every two years. The employer must discuss the application with the employee and ultimately grant it unless it conflicts clearly with important company interests. The Act includes an exhaustive list of interests (TK 26358, 1998-1999).

STAGE II

At this moment employees do not have a formal right to pregnancy leave and delivery leave (zwangerschaps- en bevallingsverlof). A maternity benefit of 16 weeks does exist though. In practice almost every employee gets a 16 weeks paid maternity leave in case this is necessary. The proposal is to arrange a legal leave-right. All the conditions like length and the level of the benefit will be the same as before.

‘Bonding leave’

This new proposed Act is meant for adoption parents. In the first weeks after an adoption, the parents and the child should have the possibility to bind. Also it takes a lot of time to arrange an adoption or to pick up the child in a foreign country. The government wants to introduce a four weeks paid ‘bonding leave’ for one of the adoption parents. This Act is still in preparation. Recently, this proposal has changed. The new proposal will give a three weeks paid ‘bonding leave’ to both parents (Min VWS, 1999).

STAGE III

Calamity-leave (Calimiteitenverlof): expansion of the existing calamity-leave with a temporary unpaid care-leave is proposed. This Act should be a supplement to the existing calamity leave. This existing care-leave enables the employee to take a short break during working time to take care of certain urgent (family-)matters without losing pay. In case of a defected waterworks or a suddenly sick child the employee should have the opportunity to take some emergency measures. But an individual right to leave for a number of days to take care of a sick child is lacking in our country. A claused right to such a temporary unpaid care-leave with a maximum of ten days per year is in preparation. The family-circle and the seriousness of the caring need needs some demarcation. It is a claused right, this means that the company’s interest must be taken into consideration when a person takes up the leave. The government considers partial income support important, but the social partners are responsible for making agreements about pay during the leave. The government will take care of other border conditions, i.e. in the fiscal and social insurance law the government creates possibilities for leave-saving.

The coalition agreement also mentions the need for a legal leave-system when one of the parents or family members is sick for a longer period of time (termijngebonden zorgverlof), then just ten days. In the case an employee has a serious sick family member the term bound-leave can turn into a long-term unpaid-leave. This right is also claused and based upon made-to-measure. The extension and the length of the leave must be decided per individual situation (TK 26447, 1998-1999).

The government observes a growing need among employees for possibilities to interrupt their career for a certain period of time. This Career Breaks (Funding) Act (Wet Financiering Loopbaanonderbreking) provides for an allowance, subject to certain conditions, for employees who agree with their employer to take long-term leave for reasons of care or education. This Act is designed to encourage people to take leave for care and study purposes. The requirement, that an unemployed person on benefit should replace the person taking leave, makes it an activation tool as well. The leave must be at least two months. The person taking the leave receives an allowance rising to a gross maximum of 860 guilders (440 euro) for a period of up 18 months (TK 26477, 1998-1999). Most of the existing leave-arrangements are unpaid now. Especially men hold back to take a leave (especially long-term leave). If the leave period is paid, one of the most important hindrances to take the leave will be removed.

Up to now employees loose certain rights to social security benefits when they take an unpaid leave. The government wants to remove these obstacles for employees. After a leave-period an employee should not be confronted with disadvantages. The removal of obstacles will increase the number persons taking an unpaid leave (TK 25618, 1997-1998).

A legal fiscal frame is in preparation to encourage leave-saving (verlofsparen) in favour of interrupting the career. A turn-back arrangement (omkeerregeling): tax and premium assessment will be delayed to the moment the leave is taken, is in preparation. The proposed arrangement offers a possibility to shift at most 10 percent of wage to a future point of time (TK 26447, 1998-1999).

Government wants to modify vacation legislation. An employee should be able to save vacation days for a longer period. This period is limited to 2 years and should be changed into 5 years. This would enable employees to interrupt their normal work for longer periods.

As mentioned earlier in this paper, this Parental Leave Act (Wet Ouderschapsverlof) is modified. Now parents with children under 8 can apply and the minimum of 20 hours is abolished. Employees have a right to this leave without pay if; they are parent or durable take care of a child, they are at least one year employed and their child is under 8. The number of leave hours a parent can take are at the most the number of working hours per week over a period of 13 weeks. In principle should these hours be taken in a dense period of six months.

The existence of affordable childcare is essential for the combination of labour and care. The announced Act Basic Facilities Child-care (Wet Basisvoorziening Kinderopvang) must form a sufficient supply of child-care places for children between 0 and 12 years and some experiments for care between 12 and 16 years (childcare facilities outside school). The government is at this moment working at more concrete proposals. Some temporary measures are already taken to extend care places for children between 4-12 years and 12-16 years. The municipalities receive extra subsidies when she creates extra child-care places or start up new care projects for teenagers.

In 1996 a first version of this Act was established. Meanwhile a lot of changes have taken place.

The target group of this Act are single parents (who receive social assistance or another social security benefit) who are searching for a job or follow an education which will lead to a paid job. The children have to be in primary education. Also a parent with no benefit but who just started working can apply for this subsidy of 90% to 100% of personal child care costs. Since 1999 there is also an income-test: the income of the single parent may not exceed 130 percent of the assistance benefit level (TK 26447,1999).

The coalition agreement also wants to make it easier for a beneficiary to combine work and care. In principle the beneficiary should be available for the labour market. This can lead to problems when he or she has to take care of a child. At this moment people who receive social assistance and who have a child under five do not have to be available for the labour market. Parents with older children have to be available.

Table 3.1 shows the devlopment in the numbers of social security benefit claimants from 1970 till 1998.

The table shows the following trends:

• National pension AOW: a steady increasing number of beneficiaries due to the ageing of the population
• Survivors: a decrease from 1996 onwards, in which the new Survivors Pension Act was introduced, which made access more difficult and introduced a means-test
• Disability: a decrease in the numbers for the national insurance AAW in 1998 and a related increase in the workers insurance WAO, due to a change in structure (see later WAZ and WAJONG). The total number of disability benefit claimants decreased temporarily after 1994 (effects of the so-called T-laws of 1992 and 1993), but increases again from 1997 onwards (possible reasons: relaxation of criteria for older workers, aging of the labourforce, increased labour participation of women, non-use of and failing re-integration measures, passivity of the administrations (Ctsv 1999, August-report)).
• Sickness: strong decrease in 1994 due to TZ act on reducing sickness absence, a further decrease in 1996 due to WULBZ, but a rise again in recent years (growing employment, people got used to the new rules, increased labour participation of women)
• Unemployment: see also section 1.1
• Social assistance: A slow decrease in recent years, due to growing employment.

The economic crisis of the 1980s learned that the Dutch social security system could be overloaded and eventually collapse. The initial reaction was to try to keep social expenditures under control by lowering the duration and level of benefits. This reaction was known as "price" policy, because it was mainly directed at keeping the system affordable. However, by 1990 the number of employees insurance beneficiaries had increased by over 300.000 from 1982, which more than offset the decline in the number of social assistance beneficiaries during this period. Subsequently, the emphasis was put on "volume" policies which were aimed at reducing the accessibility of schemes and gaining control over the inflow of beneficiaries.

The reconstruction of the national insurances was not only the result of economic developments. It also reflected changes in Dutch society and culture. Revisions aimed to "modernise" the schemes by making them consistent with changing role patterns of men and women, particularly the increased participation of women in the labour force. This modernisation resulted in equal rights for men and women in all schemes. Where the modernisation of schemes implied a broadening of the entitled population, there was a conflict with the general aim of cutting back on social expenditures. The solution was that means tests were introduced to keep total expenditure under control.

The ‘price’, ‘volume’ and modernisation measures taken subsequently include:

There is no doubt that these measures have contributed to putting a halt to the trend towards increasing numbers of beneficiaries and increasing expenditures. The system’s collapse was prevented. On the other hand, there is no prospect for a fast and substantial decrease in benefit demand and expenditures. The disability numbers nowadays come close to 900.000 and long-term unemployment still is a structural phenomenon.

Recognising the permanence of benefit dependency government gradually developed a new concept of social security, based on a fundamental critique on the built-in anonymity and irresponsibility in the model of collective solidarity. The national and collective nature of the system is supposed to undermine individual responsibility and to promote calculative behaviour by all actors involved, be it citizens, workers, employers, unions, or companies. Based on this diagnosis, market elements are introduced such as freedom of choice (for employers whether or not to take part in collective insurance) and risk differentiation (industries with higher levels of risk for disability paying higher contributions), which in essence are aimed at reintroducing individual responsibility, by way of confronting all actors more directly with the costs of social protection. The diagnosis also catalysed the trend towards activation, which comprises extended policies aimed at the (re-) insertion of beneficiaries into paid and even unpaid work (see next sections).

All in all, a shift has taken place from inclusive solidarity towards the direction of exclusive selectivity, from collective responsibility towards the direction of individual responsibility. With this shift the overall level of citizens’ social protection has declined. This loss, however, does not affect everybody to the same degree. Part of the decrease in protection offered by the collective system has been ‘repaired’ for workers in newly bargained collective labour contracts. The loss of collective social protection is also compensated at the household level as a result of the increased labour market participation of women, and the accompanying increase in double income households: more often the misfortunes of one partner can be compensated by the other partner’s means. Clearly, however, those who have lost most of their social protection are people with weaker or no ties to the market for paid labour. These include workers on flexible contracts, young workers, workers with repeated unemployment spells, and beneficiaries who have little chance of returning to the labour market, such as pensioners, disabled workers, long term unemployed and single parents.

Since the mid-1980s a lot of changes were made in the Dutch Unemployment Act WW. Recently, the changes have shifted from WW itself to all other kinds of laws and measures that are implemented in order to prevent people from having to apply for WW and in order to facilitate the outflow from WW. All these measures are called activation. Recent examples can be found in chapter 1. Administrative adjustments in the field of unemployment are discussed in chapter 5.

Only minor changes have actually occurred in the WW itself recently. The most striking example is the introduction of the obligation for older (>57,5 years) unemployed to accept suitable work (from May 1999). They have to register at a labour office and if a suitable job is offered, they will have to accept that. There is still one difference with younger (<57.5 years) unemployed: the older group has no obligation to seek jobs actively themselves.

This means that now all unemployed have to accept all suitable jobs that are offered to them until they reach the pensionable age. This change is due to the fact that Dutch policy is recently aimed at keeping older persons at work (see statement 4 of the Dutch National Employment Action Plan 1999), for reasons of economising on benefits and contributing to the participation of older workers and the deployment of the total labour force.

The National Employment Action Plan 1999 of the Netherlands mentions that in the future the duty to actively seek for jobs will also be implemented for the older unemployed.

In a further attempt to get control on the WAO inflow, the PEMBA law took effect in 1998. It aims at influencing behaviour of employers in such a way that they feel an individual responsibility for the prevention of disability as well as for the (re-)insertion of disabled workers. The law introduced two measures, contribution differentiation and opting out or privatisation. Before PEMBA contributions for the WAO scheme were not differentiated according to risk, i.e. to the number of disability claims coming from individual firms and sectors of industry. All paid a uniform percentage of wages. Under PEMBA such percentages, and thus the amount of contributions, is differentiated according to risk (within certain limits) and have to be paid by the employers. As a result, firms and sectors of industry that generate more disability claims have higher costs. They can cut costs by preventing disability claims. This can be done either by an improvement of working circumstances, or by adapting workplaces for disabled employees. PEMBA also offers individual firms the option to leave the collective system for the first five years of disablement and assume responsibility for the disability and subsequent benefits that it generates. (Some large companies and branches have already chosen to ‘opt out’, but the first signs are that only few will follow).

With the PEMBA-act employees derive all their disablement rights from the WAO-act. As a result the AAW loses the character of a people’s insurance. For that reason and for efficiency reasons the AAW-act is replaced by two new arrangements, namely the Self-employed Persons Disablement Benefits Act (WAZ) and the Disablement Assistance Act for Handicapped Young Persons (Wajong) (see next sections).

The government expects that in the first years after the introduction of PEMBA the number of new WAO-benefits will decrease by 10 to 15 per cent. However, recent research among employers learns, that it is not expected that PEMBA will contribute to a more positive reintegration policy. Just 8% of employers say to expect that disabled persons will have more changes to be appointed, thanks to PEMBA. Only about 50% of them say that, as a consequence of the differentiation in contributions, they will increase their investments in prevention of illness and disability. 60% of the employers say that PEMBA is a reason to pay even more attention to the risk of disablement of new personnel during the process of appointment. Even after the Act on Medical Examinations (WMK) came into effect in 1998, companies often indicate that a medical examination is carried out before new employees are appointed and/or that they ask questions about the health of new employees (44% of all companies). Thus, it is concluded, the negative effects of risk selection will overshadow the possibly positive reintegration effects of PEMBA (Ctsv 1998).

The WAZ, or Self-employed Persons Disablement Benefits Act of 1998, insures loss of earnings resulting from long-term disability. All self-employed persons and their spouses who help in the business, as well as professionals are insured under the WAZ as long as they are below the age of 65. Professionals are for instance: managing director-major shareholders, domestic help-workers, clergymen, domestic staff employed on a basis of less than three days a week. Participation is compulsory.

The amount of benefit paid depends on the degree of invalidity and the basic rate (the amount of lost earnings). The insured person must actually have had an income. The sum in question here is taken to be the income over the financial or calendar year prior to disablement. However, since self-employed persons often have an income that fluctuates, the average income over the previous five financial or calendar years may be taken for all insured persons if that sum is more favourable. The maximum basic rate is the minimum (youth) wage.

Holiday allowance is paid out in May of each year (8% of the WAZ benefit).

If WAZ benefit, together with any other family income, is less than the minimum guaranteed income level an additional payment may be claimed on the basis of the Supplementary Benefit Act (TW).

To become entitled to WAZ benefit one must also:

WAZ benefit can be claimed for a period of five years. A new application for benefit must be made at least three months before termination of this five-year period. If the WAZ claimant comes to decease, the surviving relatives are entitled to a death grant.

Females insured under the WAZ are entitled to maternity benefit over a period of 16 weeks at least (100% of the minimum wage – at least if that was earned – or less). This benefit can also be used for replacement staff. Should this be the case, the benefit (gross) is paid out to the organisation that provides the replacement. The WAZ is financed by contributions from the self-employed.

The WAJONG, or Disablement Assistance Act for Handicapped Young Persons of 1998, makes provision for a minimum benefit for young handicapped people. The persons concerned are residents of the Netherlands who:

In the category of student are also those persons whose parents receive child allowance in connection with their study and also those persons who do not belong to these groups but who are under the age of 30 and follow lessons or practical training for at least 213 hours per three months. However, apprentices or trainees are always regarded as students, whatever their age.

Wajong benefit depends on the degree of disability and the benefit basis. The basic rate for this benefit is the minimum (youth) wage and is the same as for the WAZ- beneficiaries (see before).

If the young handicapped person needs help to such an extent that regular minding and care is essential, benefit may be increased up to a maximum of 100% of the basic rate. This does not apply if the person in question is cared for in an institution and the costs thereof are paid for by an insurer.

On grounds of the Supplementary Benefits Act (TW), if the Wajong benefit is less than the minimum guaranteed income level a supplementary allowance can be granted to persons of 21 and above, or to persons no longer living in their parental home. Persons younger than 21 years of age still living at home may claim supplementary benefit on grounds of the IOAW (Act on Income Provision for Older, Partially Disabled Unemployed Persons).

A young handicapped person is entitled to Wajong benefit:

The young handicapped person must report to the social security agency within the first 13 weeks of the qualifying period. Benefit must have been applied for three months before the qualifying period terminates. Wajong benefit may not be granted prior to the applicant’s 18^th birthday.

Wajong benefit is granted for a period of five years. A new application for benefit must be made at least three months before termination of this five-year period. Entitlement to Wajong benefits ceases if the person concerned takes up residence in a foreign country; entitlement can be continued upon that person’s return to the Netherlands. Upon the decease of a Wajong claimant, his surviving relatives are entitled to a death allowance.

The Wajong replaced the AAW for young handicapped persons on 1 January 1998. There is no change for those persons who were claiming AAW benefit on that date, apart from the fact that their benefit is now called Wajong. Persons in the qualifying period on that date will receive Wajong benefit in accordance with the former AAW regulations.

Wajong is usually implemented by the social security agency GAK Nederland bv and is state financed.

In 1969 the Act on Sheltered Workplaces (WSW) provides working places for those disabled persons who can carry out certain types of activities and are thus capable of work, but for whom, due to personal circumstances, employment under normal conditions and at a normal pace is not possible. Municipalities have to organise sheltered workplaces in which the working capabilities of the persons involved can be preserved, recovered or stimulated. The WSW 1969 is not primarily aiming at re-integrating people back into regular paid labour.

In 1998 a new act on sheltered labour (WSW 1998) has come into effect. In the WSW 1998 the responsibilities of the municipalities are defined more strictly. Placing or detaching in a regular workplace is now possible, as well as a normalisation of the labour relation. In this way the chances for flowing into the regular labour market increases. The possibility of offering a workplace in an especially established sheltered workshop remains. But it can be concluded that in the WSW 1998 re-integrating people back into regular paid labour has become more important.

Furthermore the definition of the personal scope is sharpened. To be eligible for the WSW 1998 there must be a question of medical indicated limitations of a physical, rational or mental kind. Thus, it does not concern the handicap itself but the limitations in relation to the work to do. In this way the Netherlands harmonise with the approach in other European countries (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France and Great Britain). In December 1997 there were about 85.000 WSW-employees.

After the major 1996 reform of social assistance little of importance has changed.

During the years of social security restructuring the financial consequences of the ageing of the Dutch population have been a permanent issue in the debates. Only recently (1998) measures were taken to tackle the problem. Here we discuss first briefly the ageing of the population, followed secondly by presenting the measures.

From the 1960s onwards the average age of the Dutch population is increasing. Table 3.2 shows that the total population is growing, but that the proportion of people of 65 and over is increasing more rapidly than younger categories. The youngest category of those under 20 is decreasing. The table thus shows processes of what is called in the Dutch debate ‘greyification’ and ‘de-greaning’. There is even a ‘double greyification’, since the fastest growing category is that of the very old, people of 80 years and older.

Whereas in 1989 about 13% of the total population was 65 or over, in 2030 this will have increased to 22%, and the latest prognoses of the Central Bureau of Statistics shows that it will further increase to 25% in 2040. From then on a stabilisation and decrease can be expected.

The ageing of the population will have strong effects on e.g. housing, healthcare and consumption patterns, but also on social security. Of course, the number of old age pensions paid will increase, but before a peak is reached here the effect will be a rise in the numbers of disability and social assistance benefits. At present a large cohort is still under 65. In its pre-pension stage the ageing of this working population will first mean an increase in work incapacity, as well as an increase in long-term unemployment, since to both social risks older workers have a higher chance than younger workers. Table 3.3 shows that it is expected that the number of old age AOW pensions will double in the period from 1990 to 2030. The acceleration will mainly take place after 2010, when the post-war ‘birth-wave’ will start to retire. The number of disability benefits is expected to have increased with a third by the year 2030, as well as the number of social assistance benefits.

The growing number of AOW pensions will lead to a serious increase in expenditure: from 5.3 percent of the gross domestic product in 1995, to 7.5 percent in 2037 but to 9% if economic growth is lagging (prognoses of the Central Planning Office in TK 1997-1998, 25699, nr.3, p. 2). Since the AOW has a pay-as-you-go funding the increased costs will result in higher contributions. It is estimated that the contribution percentage will have to rise from about 15% of the wage cost now, to about 26% in 2035 (prognosis of the Central Planning Bureau CPB in TK 1997-1998, 25699, nr. 3, p.3)

The ageing of the population has also effects on the future costs of occupational pensions, despite the fact that most of them are capital funded. It is expected that extra funding, i.e. a rise in contributions, will be necessary for two reasons. First, since most of the occupational pensions top up the state pension to a percentage of the end pay, extra funding will be necessary if the pension level lags behind developments in the average wage level. The AOW-pension is linked to changes in the average level of structural wages, but not to the average level of incidental wage increases. Second, since many occupational schemes offer pay-as-you-go-financed ‘back-service’ in order to adjust occupational pensions in retrospect to increased wages and prizes, the ageing of the working population leads to higher costs: younger workers have to pay more contributions to finance the growing number of retrospectively adjusted pensions. In the 1980s a number of studies tried to estimate the expected rise in contributions for occupational pensions as a percentage of the wage-cost. The results varied between 10% and 20% (see Devreese 1989 for an overview). A recent micro-simulation study by Jansweyer (1996) suggested an increase from 7% of the wage cost in 1995, to 13% in 2010 and to 26% in 2040. This development is, however, like the results of all long-term prognoses in the field, highly dependent on assumptions about developments in wages, prizes and profits. In a number of alternative scenario’s, in which occupational pensions were assumed to be less generous (e.g. offering 60% in stead of 70% of the end pay, or under transformation of end pay to average pay systems) Jansweyer calculated the necessary rise in contributions to be significantly lower.

With regard to the national AOW scheme two measures were taken under the 1998 ‘Adjustment of the Law on the Financing of National Insurances’ (Wijziging van de Wet financiering volksverzekeringen):

Clearly, of the alternatives available central government has not chosen to lower pension costs. It has opted for maintaining the quality of the present AOW-pension by leaving the rights of pensioners and the level of benefit untouched. The basic choice for tackling the problem has been to increase contributions to the system. In order to prevent too high a pressure on the wage cost, which would have negative effects on employment, and to broaden the contribution base government has decided to take over a substantial part of the AOW financing in the longer run. It is expected that in 2040 the pension cost has its peak and will amount to about 8% of the gross domestic product. About 5.5 % would then be financed from contributions, 1.5% by government’s yearly donations and another 1% from the savings fund (TK 1997-1998, 25699, nr. 3, p. 11).

Government’s generosity is strongly related to the favourable economic circumstances that are present in the Netherlands from around the middle of the 1990s. The government’s budget deficit has decreased significantly, from 4% of the gross domestic product in 1995 to 1.6% in 1998, and employment has grown rapidly, from 6.5 million jobs in 1990 to 7.4 million in 1997. These factors offered extra means, and it is explicitly stated in the explanatory note to the law (the ‘memorie van toelichting’: TK 1997-1998, 25699, nr.3) that an important part of it will be spend on the financing of the AOW pension. Government is well aware of the fact that the future hides many insecurities that can influence positively or negatively all the important parameters. It clearly states that the measures taken can only be successful if certain conditions are met, like an increase in the labour market participation of older workers, a drop in the costs of unemployment and disability benefits and a further decrease of the budget deficit. Government considers the establishment of the saving fund and filling it in the present economically favourable circumstances to be a first insurance against any future mishaps.

Regarding occupational pensions, the second tier of the Dutch pension system, the role of central government is limited. Basically it concerns the formulation of general guarantees, the regulation of fiscal treatment of contributions and pensions and to the imposition, at the request of the representative parties, of compulsory participation in pension funds.

Because of the ageing of the population extra funding will be necessary for occupational pensions too. There might be lags between the AOW-pension and the collective pensions and the pay-as-you-go financed back service will increase. This cost aspect has been a worry of social partners and government because of the potential rise in wage costs that is implied. In 1997 mutual consultation has resulted in a voluntarily agreed covenant on occupational pensions, between government, employers and employees. It aims at modernisation, cost control and easing the entrance to pension schemes.

In this chapter we will discuss some aspects of the flexibilisation of the labour system in the Netherlands. First of all, we will give some figures on flex-work. This includes the growing number of people working on a temporary basis, and the large amount of part-timers that are active in the Netherlands. After pointing out this trend, we will give some policy background on flex-work and we will describe the new Act on Flexibility and Security (implemented from 1 January 1999 onwards).

The amount of part-time jobs in the Netherlands belongs to the highest in Europe. Table 4.1 shows that part-time and temporary work has increased steadily since the 1980s. Now nearly a third of all Dutch workers works part-time, be it that it is specially women.

The number of temporary workers has increased from 96,000 to 192,000 in three years (1993-1995), which is seen to be an outcome of the prosperous economic climate in the Netherlands, rather than a trend towards individualism, according to SCP (1998), because actual developments in the number of temporary workers follow closely economic- and jobgrowth figures.

A popular idea is that the growth of part-time jobs in the Netherlands is basically due a large number of to small (i.e. <20 hours) jobs. This is not true, however. Table 4.2 shows the percentages of part-time jobs over time. This makes clear that the main growth of jobs in the Netherlands since the mid-1980s is due to 20-34 hour jobs (SCP 1998).

Table 4.2 Distribution of different types of jobs in percentages by year

On the other hand, ‘The Dutch Miracle’, which stands for the steep increase of Dutch employment, should not be seen as a miracle if one regards the growth of the number of hours worked. This is made clear in table 4.3. There is hardly any increase in the rise of the number of hours compared to 1970 (SCP 1998).

Besides part-time jobs, another issue is the position of flex-work, people with unsteady and temporary labour contracts. Some popular statements are that flex-work is increasing very strongly. This is not the case in the Netherlands. Only about 12 percent of all jobs are flexible. Table 4.4 shows some aspects of this issue.

Nearly 90 percent of Dutch workers work on a permanent contract. However, within this group, the number of part-timers and the number of people who work with changing work-hours (e.g. personnel that works in shifts) is increasing.

Lately, this figure of about ten percent of flex-work seems to stabilise. Possibly flexible work has reached its ‘natural boundaries’, mainly because of the relatively high costs that are involved (costs of temporary working agencies, losing employees who had experience, etc.). This view on the future of flex-work is shared by the Social-Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad), TNO Labour (TNO Arbeid), a research institute , and CBS (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek).

Recent research by TNO Labour gives another interesting view on this matter. Around 17 percent of all Dutch companies state that they want to decrease the number of flexible workers. Only around 10 percent states that they want to increase this number (Grijpstra et al, 1999).

We have seen that it is especially women that work part-time. The same counts for flex-work: women are more into flex-work than men. This is shown in table 4.5, which shows the percentage of the total labour population that is working on a flexible basis (including temporary work).

Before 1999 the trend towards flexible work has been pointed out in several reports and studies, but this has never resulted in legislation.

In 1995 a discussion paper on ‘Flexibility and Security’ was issued by government, which stressed that more flexibility on the one hand, and more security on the other, is needed in the Dutch labour market. This note mentioned three main goals for the future: 1. Enlarging the flexibility of permanent workers, 2. Improving the legal status of flexible workers and 3. Increasing the possibilities of having flexible working contracts. The main critique on the ideas expressed has been that the note put too much emphasis on flexibility, and too little on the legal status of employees. In 1996 a second note appeared that was written by the Stichting van de Arbeid (Star: Labourfoundation), at the request of the Dutch government (Janssens, 1998). The Star already published a report on flexibility in 1993, but the 1996 report puts more focus on actual policy instead of pointing out the flexibility trend and the need for policy (which was the main conclusion in 1993). The Star got agreement between the social partners on their note ‘Flexibility and Security’, which was called the ‘Star-agreement’.The Star-agreement gave a lot of actual policy recommendations, which were followed in the Act on Flexibility and Security of 1999.

Relevant is also that in 1 July 1998 the Dutch Parliament agreed on an act called WAADI (Wet allocatie arbeidskrachten door intermediairs), which took care of some aspects of temporary work agencies. First of all, these agencies do not longer need a permit to have people work for them. The maximum duration (six months) of temporary work has been abolished. Furthermore, it is forbidden to provide workers to a company that is in a collective conflict on labour, e.g. a company that is on strike. Finally, the responsibility for non-pay of social security and loan taxes has been put at the company where the temporary worker is actually working, not at the agency. This is mainly done for reasons of fraud-prevention (TK 1996-1997, 25264).

Finally, the covenant of April 1996 that has been drawn up by the social partners of the temporary work sector, should also be mentioned here. This covenant has agreed with the Star-agreement on ‘Flexibility and Security’. Furthermore, this covenant (Janssens, 1998) gives rules for temporary workers in four phases, which will be described in detail later on. Main rule is that the longer someone is working, the more security (s)he will get. This covenant will last for five years, starting from 1999.

In 1999 the Flexibility and Security Act (Wet Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid) came into operation. Clearly, this act does not just take care of social security rights for ‘flexible’ workers. It does give rules for more security for them while they are working, but it tries to find the right balance between security and flexibility: security of work, income and jobprotection for the employee on the one hand, and flexibility for the employer on the other. This facilitates the employability of flexible workers, who were sometimes unprotected and therefore a very vulnerable group of workers. The Flexibility and Security Act contains several subjects. All will be described below. (See also Meijer et al, 1999 and Nicolai, 1998).

If someone is working for an employer, it might be unclear whether this can be described as a contract of employment or not. This is especially the case if the duration of labour is very unstable, unclear or short. Especially in those cases where there is little or no description of the number of hours to work. The problem is then to establish whether there is a employer-employee relationship or not. This is relevant for establishing social security rights.

The Flexibility and Security act states that if someone has been working three months with a minimum of 20 hours a months, it can be described as a contract of employment. If the employer thinks that there is a question on this matter, than he has to prove this. For example, if the employer thinks that he has no contract of employment with his ‘employee’, although the ‘employee’ works more than 20 hours a months during three months, he has to make clear why he thinks so. If, on the other hand, the ‘employee’ works less than 20 hours during three months, but he thinks there is a contract of employment, the ‘employee’ will have to give good arguments why he thinks so. So this implies that a contract of employment can still be defined differently, but the starting point is 20 hours a month in three months. The dimension of the contract of employment will be the number of hours worked in the three month period. Before 1999 there were no clear rules on this matter, except for some vague guidelines that caused a lot of uncertainty in practice.

Some employees have so called ‘on-call’ contracts. Also, some employees may have a ‘normal’ job, but besides that the duty to show up if their employer demands that. The problem with this is that it might lead to situations where someone will have to show up, which takes time and effort, without having to work very long. This leads to undesired situations. To compensate for this, every time the employee is called for, the employer has to pay at least three hours, regardless of the fact whether the employer has worked less hours or not. Comparable rules already exist in Germany and Belgium.

There are two clear situation to establish whether this rule is applicable or not: the first situation is when the duties agreed take 14 hours or less a week and there is no agreement on when these hours will be worked. Secondly, this rule is applicable if the duration of the working activities have not been agreed on (clearly). So for example, if the employer and employee agree that the employee works 1 hour every day from 14.00h to 15.00h, he will get paid for only 1 hour each day. If this situation occurs without clear preceding agreement, this person gets paid 3 hours a day per call.

An employee will only get paid for if he actually does his work. If he does not actually fulfill his duties, the employer has the right not to pay salary. There is one exception to this rule: if the reason of not being able to work can be attributed to the employer (with "fair" reasons), than the employee still keeps his right on salary. This might occur, for example, if the employer forgets to open his shop on time, and the employee is waiting in front of a closed door.

This rule is by itself nothing new, it already existed for years. It was, however, possible to exclude employees from this right by making individual agreements on this matter. The Flexibility and Security Act still allows this exclusion, but with a maximum duration of the first six months of employment. After this period, exclusion is only possible if agreed by collective agreement between employer and labour union.

Probationary period

Before an employer decides whether or not to hire a new employee, he may decide to make use of a probationary period. There used to be a maximum duration of two months. For some labour contracts that only last for a short time (e.g. one year), these two months were disproportionally high. Therefore the new law decided that for shorter contracts a shorter maximum duration will be introduced.

A contract of less than two years, or a temporary contract with an undefined or unpredictable ending (e.g. for incidental projects) can only have a maximum probationary period of one month. The duration of this period can be enlarged by collective agreement between employer and labour union, with a maximum of (totally) two months.

A contract of employment for a defined period usually ends because the maximum duration time that has been agreed upon between employer and employee has been reached. These temporary contracts offer the employer a way of filling in temporary demand for labour.

One problem for employers with temporary contracts was that if they wanted to lengthen the contract (but still keep it as a temporary contract), the possibility of firing the temporary worker became much more difficult. This conflicts with the wish for flexibility. This situation also forces employers to choose between to extreme options: either enlarging the contract (and thereby making it a permanent job), or losing a good worker because he cannot enlarge the contract.

The employee, on the other hand, will find himself a hard time getting security from a temporary contract. He might be working for different employers as long as a permanent worker for one employer, but still be much weaker if one regards his right to prevent dismissal.

The Act on Flexibility and Security tries to enlarge the possibilities and rights for both the employer and employee in situations of what is called in Dutch schakelarbeid (chain-labour, i.e. several temporary contracts following one another).

The flexibility and security act provides the possibility to have three successive contracts of employment after which the contract between employer and employee ends without need for permission by authorities (court (kantonrechter) or the Regional Manager of the Labour Provision Organisation,i.e. of the regional labour office (Regionaal Directeur Arbeidsvoorzieningenorganisatie-RDA)). These three (maximum) contracts can only last for (maximum) 36 months. If the contract exceeds this period of 36 months, than it is considered to be a contract without a specified ending: a permanent contract. In that case, permission by authorities is needed to end the contract.

There might be a situation in which there is a gap between the periods. Only if this gap is no bigger than three months, the separate contracts will be added up as stated above. If there is a bigger gap, the contracts will be regarded as unconnected with each other.

Another point is the case of a contract with a defined ending that lasts at least 36 months, but is enlarged after that. The above says that in that case it should be seen as a permanent contract, because the two contracts add up to more than 36 months. If, however, the enlarging is at most three months, it is still not regarded as a permanent contract. This exception has been made for projects that take just a little more time than expected.

Than there is another issue. How to deal with situations in which different employers can be observed as ‘following up’ each other? For example: someone works for A with a year-contract, after which he gets transferred to a different employer B. B, however, is part of the same organisation. In this case A and B are seen to be the same and therefore the contracts will be ‘added up’. In case of working for C after A, if C is a completely different employer (e.g. the competitor of A), no contracts are added up. Finally, if in the first period the employee has worked for a temporary work agency at a certain company and then he gets a contract at the same company (but without intervention of the temporary work agency), the contracts will also be added up.

Exceptions can be made only by collective agreement between employer and labour unions.

Temporary employment agencies fill in a big demand for temporary workers by taking care of administration and recruitment of temporary workers. More and more people find jobs by way of these agencies (in 1994 their number was 144,900; 33,800 of them worked more than 2 years for an agency (TK 1996-1997, 25263)) . They seem to be working very effectively, but more clarity on the rights of temporary workers is regarded needed.

Specifically, for a long time there has been uncertainty about the relation between agency and worker. Should this be seen as a relation at all or as a temporary situation? The Flexibility and Security act gives a straight answer: after 26 weeks the relation is seen as an employer-employee relation in which the agency has a relation with the employee. It is possible to differ from this rule if collective agreement can be reached. This has already been done by the Dutch social partners in April 1996. In this year, they formulated a covenant for temporary workers that will be valid for five years, starting together with the Security and Flexibility Act on 1 January 1999 (Janssens, 1998).

The starting point of the covenant is that the longer someone works for the same temporary work agency, the stronger the bond between agency and worker will be. We will make the covenant rules clear by using an example. First of all, there is the employee A, who works for the temporary work agency B. Employer C is looking for a temporary worker and asks for the help of B. B asks A to work for C and if A accepts this offer, A starts to work in phase I. Note that legally A is working for B: the agency.

Phase I lasts for 26 weeks and is nothing different than before 1999. This phase is ‘unprotected’, if C does not want to make use of A anymore, or if A does not want to work anymore, the process stops. Every week in which work for B has been done by A is counted as a week. If there is a gap between the weeks that lasts for more than a year, than the counting of the weeks starts again. Note that in case of lack of work there is no obligation to pay A.

After 26 weeks phase II starts. This period is again practically ‘unprotected’, just as phase I. This lasts for six months. If there is a gap between two working periods within this phase that lasts longer than three months, counting in phase II starts again (as if A just started to work in phase II). If this gap lasts for more than a year, A will be put back in phase I. In addition to phase I, A has a right to have a conversation with B about schooling possibilities and old-age pension.

After 26 weeks phase I and 6 months phase II A enters phase III (if C still wants to make use of A). In this phase, that lasts 6 months if A continues to work for C, or 24 months in case of working for several others than C (e.g. if employer D, E, F and G also ask B for temporary workers), A has a right for work for three months. If there is no work during this period, he gets paid anyway. After not having worked three months, A starts again at the beginning of phase III. If A has not worked for a full year, he will be put back all the way to phase I.

After this phase III, A will be put in phase IV, which gives him or her a permanent contract. If there is no work, A will be paid anyway. In this case, B will have to provide for work for A. So in this phase IV there is a contract of employment between A and B. The temporary worker works as any ‘normal’ employee for employer B, who happens to be a temporary work agency.

This is a very fundamental change compared to the situation before 1999. One of the main advantages for an employer is the fact that he can hire a temporary worker (via a temporary work agency) as long as he wants. He has no obligation to hire this worker himself permanently. That obligation occurs in phase IV for the agency B, not for the employer C.

For the employee, this means that he will have more security for work and income. After a certain period, he gets a ‘normal’ job with all advantages (like getting paid when there is no work or in case of sickness) that all ‘normal’ employees also have.

As with any contract, a contract of employment can be ended if this is felt necessary. This might be because of reasons of personal misbehaviour of the employee (e.g. steeling) or employer (e.g. sexual assault), financial reasons (e.g. business is bankrupt), etc. Ending the contract cannot be done without permission by the authorities. In the Dutch case this means that the employer has to go to court (kantonrechter) or to the Regional Manager of the Labour Supply Organisation, i.e. de regional labour office (Regionaal Directeur Arbeidsvoorzieningenorganisatie-RDA). The most common procedure is called cancellation, which is done via RDA. Ending the contract in another way will be discussed in the next paragraph. This cancellation-procedure, however, was time-consuming and thereby caused irritation among all parties.

Therefore, the Flexibility and Security Act introduces some changes that will be described in this paragraph. First of all, the period of notice for the employer and employee has been changed. This period is one month during the first five years of employment. Every next five years, this period will be enlarged by one month. Maximum duration is, however, four months. For the employee who wants to quit, the period of notice is at least one month. There is a possibility to agree on a longer period of notice, which can be maximally six months. In that case, the period of notice for the employer must be no shorter than twice the period of notice that counts for the employee.

Secondly, the rules for dismissal have, administratively, changed. The period for the RDA to work on a request for dismissal has been shortened to a desired (no guarantee can be given in case of complicated dismissals) maximum of four to five weeks (which was six weeks). Also, in case of collective dismissal, the waiting period of one month, that existed before 1999, has been removed. Also, if dismissal is requested, and after this request the employee gets sick, this will have no impact on the dismissal procedure. Before 1999, sickness usually inflicted a lot of waiting, because a permission for dismissal would not have been given.

The Dutch Unemployment Act (WW) includes a statement that says that if the unemployment due to dismissal is culpable (i.e. the employee is unemployed because of his own (mis)behaviour), no benefit will be granted. This meant, however, that for every dismissal the employee had to make a note of protest against his dismissal (otherwise he could be judged culpable and not be granted benefit). In several occasions, this protest was just for form’s sake. In the Flexibility and Security Act, no protest by the employee is needed anymore if dismissal is due to economic reasons.

Finally, if both employee and employer decide to end their contract, no approval by RDA is needed anymore. This is to facilitate a situation in which protection for the employee is seen to be unnecessary because both parties insist on ending the contract.

If the contract is ended by cancellation, the new act states that notification of this fact has to be done written if the employee asks for that.

If the contract of labour is ended differently than has been described before, no period of notice is needed. This might occur in case of a termination of the contract of employment with approval of both parties, or if the termination has been approved in court. In this case, the right to a WW-benefit will occur earlier than if there would have been a period of notice. It might, however, also occur that for a certain period the former employee still receives money from his former employer as a way of compensation. This income has no influence on the acquiring of WW, because the WW lacks a means test. This implies that the former employee will get ‘double paid’.

Former employees who do, on the other hand, have a period of notice do not have this accumulation of rights. They only get their WW after the period of notice. This situation is seen to be inequitable by the Dutch government. Therefore, they decided to introduce a fictitious period of notice. Only after this period is ended, he will be granted WW. During this fictitious period of notice, the former employee will still be insured for sickness and disability to work. The duration ot this period is as long as the duration would have been if the contract was ended by ‘normal’ procedure with the RDA (cancellation).

During working hours, accidents might occur. If such an accident occurs because of reasons of the employer, the employer can be hold responsible for this. In case of temporary work, the employer will be the agency. There is, in the new act, a so-called third party (in our previous example: C) who can also be held responsible for damage that has been inflicted to the employee. So in case A works for B at a factory that belongs to C, and due to reasons of C A gets hurt, C can be hold responsible for this. This is by itself nothing new, but it used to be jurisprudence, now written down as a law in the Act on Flexibility and Security.

Changes in the execution of social security during the nineties mainly concern the worker’s insurances. In this section we will describe and comment the relevant developments in that period as well as the changes that government recently prepared for the next century. However, we start with a short outline of the social security organisation of the worker’s insurances since 1952. In that way the changes in the nineties can be understood better, as the 1952-structure did hold until the nineties.

Since 1952 industrial insurance boards (bedrijfsverenigingen) administered the worker’s insurances WW, WAO and ZW. Representatives of employers and employees governed these boards. They were allowed to administer the execution of the insurances by themselves or to delegate it to the Common Administration Office (Gemeenschappelijk administratiekantoor, GAK).

The boards were united in the Federation of Insurance Boards (Federatie van Bedrijfsverenigingen, FBV). The FBV was also governed by employers and employees. One of the Federation’s main activities was to coordinate the execution of the worker’s insurances. The Social insurance council (Sociale Verzekeringsraad, Svr) supervised the activities of the Federation and the boards. The council was governed by employers, employees and independent members. However, the first two groups had the majority within the board of governance. On top of it all was the minister of Social affairs and Employment, who, by the way, most seldom used his power to give directives to the social security administration.

In 1993 a research commission of the parliament concluded that the way the industrial insurance boards, that is the employers and employees, administered the workers disability-insurance (WAO), had contributed to the large number of beneficiaries. Furthermore, the commission concluded that the supervision of the Svr had failed. Partly, as it was said, because in the hierarchy of the institutions the employers and employees supervised and controlled themselves.

In the debate on the commission=s findings and recommendations the parliament agreed, among other things, to realise:

• an independent structure of supervision;
• an execution of the worker’s insurances by region instead of by branches of industry;
• and regional cooperation of the execution of the worker’s insurances and employment services, including municipal social services and regional job centers (the idea of one front-office).

Rather soon after the debate the wishes of parliament were translated in new legislation. In 1995 parliament accepted a new act on the organisation of social insurances (the OSV 1995). Two years later this act was replaced by the OSV 1997. At present the OSV 2001 is in preparation. This act ought to regulate and structure the execution of the worker’s insurances for the next century. It should also complete the privatisation of the execution of the worker’s insurances. Next, the main characteristics of the three acts will be discussed.

In the OSV 1995 the Svr is transformed into the Social Security Supervisory Board (College toezicht sociale verzekeringen, Ctsv). The Ctsv-management exist of three independent members. Their main task is to supervise the legitimacy and efficacy of the social security administration and to correct the administration if necessary. Other tasks fulfilled by the Svr, such as coordination, regulation and advise were transferred to the new but temporary institute of coordination and tuning (Tijdelijk instituut voor coördinatie en afstemming, Tica). The Tica-management is formed by an equal number of employers and employees and an independent chairman, who is appointed by the government. In fact, Tica replaces the FBV.

The industrial boards, still under control of employers and employees, are forbidden to administer the workers insurances by themselves. They are separated from their administrations, which are reorganised into so called social security agencies (uitvoeringsinstellingen, uvi=s). The boards remain responsible for the execution of the insurances. However, personal ties between the management of the boards and the uvi’s are not allowed. Furthermore, the boards are obliged to cooperate with the public job centers . The chairman of Tica has to simulate a regional execution of the insurances and the job services.

Finally, the Common Medical Service (Gemeenschappelijke Medische Dienst, GMD), established in 1967, is abolished. Its medical and reintegration tasks involving the execution of the disability act (WAO) are assigned to the uvi’s (Kapteijns, 1998, SCP 1996).

Historically, the social insurance boards and their administrations had public and private tasks. The first concerned the worker’s insurances, the latter concerned, for example, occupational supplementary benefits and pension schemes. However, the social security agents, introduced in the OSV 1995 are not allowed to execute private tasks. Thus, the insurance boards would loose their private activities, as they did not have an administration body at their disposal. As a reaction holdings were constructed and divided in two main divisions A and B. The A-division contains the uvi’s and executes the public duties. The B-division administers the insurance board’s private tasks, which tasks are extended, for example, with private insurances, information- and employment-finding services. The cooperation between the A- and B-division is strictly regulated by the government. An absolute separation between the (personal) data and the financial means of the private and public division is one of the main conditions. In this way it must be secured that public money cannot be used for private purposes.

The uvi=s experience the separation as an obstacle for offering >full service packages= and as a cause of more administration costs and inefficacies. Besides the tendency to construct holdings, there is a trend towards mergers of holdings and alliances of holdings with private (insurance) companies. Nowadays there are five holdings, each holding contains a uvi (Kapteijns 1998, SCP 1996).

Two years later, in the OSV 1997, the industrial boards were abolished. The public tasks of the insurance boards are taken over by the National Institute for Social Insurance (Lisv, the follow up of Tica). The Lisv-management is formed by employers, employees, independent members and an independent chairman. The Lisv is assigned the task of administering workers insurances schemes through contracts with the social security agencies, the uvi=s. So called sector-councils (sectorraden, councils with employers and employees) advise the Lisv on that subject and look after the interests of the branches of industries which they represent.

The Lisv is charged with the coordination of the administrative tasks. This coordination is notably important as far as the medico-ergonomic assessment of incapacity for work is concerned. Among other things, the Lisv is also responsible for the improvement of the cooperation between the agencies and other actors in the field of social legislation, such as social services in the municipalities and the job centers.

For these cooperation Centres for Work and Income (Centra voor Werk en Inkomen, CWI) are established. In 1999 about fifty Centres are operational. In the nearby future more than 200 Centres must function in the field of employment finding and reintegration.

On the road to the next Organisation act, the OSV 2001, the Dutch government intends to privatise the uvi’s completely. It aims at lowering the administration costs and at more competition between the agencies, for example in the field of reintegration. However, the decisions about disability and unemployment claims will remain in the public domain. Especially those decisions that contain strong discretion, such as culpable unemployment , imposing fines and tracking fraud. These tasks will be executed on a regional level (where private uvi’s must cooperate with public administrations).

Furthermore, on a central level several tasks belong to the public domain. For example, the administration of the central funds, the granting of public reintegration funds, information services and the stimulation of transparency on the private market for social insurances.

As far as these public tasks are executed by a holding’s private division these public tasks will be replaced in the public domain.

Thus, public tasks will be removed from the A-division in the holding and a separation between the public and private division will not be necessary anymore. In this way the uvi’s become private social security agents which only execute those public tasks that contain no discretion. For example, paying out benefits, verifying daily wages, loss of working hours and the obligation of insurance. Important is that this new type of uvi’s is responsible for the reintegration of disabled persons. They can do that by themselves or contract out to private organisations. As an incentive the government will offer the uvi’s a bonus for a successful reintegration.

It also will be made less difficult for new uvi’s to enter the market by lowering the existing thresholds. However, the newcomers need permission of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. Furthermore, large companies (100 employees or more) or branches of industries will be allowed to contract an agency to administer the workers insurances for their employees.

Government expects that these changes will stimulate the competition between agencies and increase the reintegration of disabled persons. However, these changes will not take place before the year 2002.

For the last 25 years government tried to control the healthcare system, in terms of its costs (distribution) and its quality. Recently, in the so-called agenda 2000+, the Ministry of Health (1997) summarised the present problems as follows: (1) a better co-operation between different forms of support/aid is needed (2) there is a need for increasing the efficiency of the administration and the management (3) the transparency and the surveyability (including the existing legal acts) has to be increased (4) there is need for a clearer demarcation of financial and controlling responsibilities (5) There is a desire to tune the services better to the wishes and needs of the patient (SCP, 1998).

Clearly, Dutch government is of the opinion that the healthcare system is not functioning optimally. The agenda 2000+ issues show that, as in the case of social security, one is particularly concerned with matters of administration and implementation. We will not present here the measures taken in this respect, because they are of a highly technical and particularistic nature. We will confine ourselves to those measures which may have a direct effect upon the costs and quality of care for consumers.

Basic legal instruments at the disposition of government to control prices and quality now are: the Act on Prices of Medicines (Wet op Geneesmiddelenprijzen), Act on Healthcare Tariffs (Wet Tarieven Gezondheidszorg) and the Act on Hospitalservices (Wet Ziekenhuisvoorzieningen).

Long-term care needs are covered by the universal General Act on Special Sickness Costs (AWBZ). Short-term needs by the Sickness Fund Act (ZFW) for households on lower incomes and by private insurance for higher incomes.

There is a general tendency in policy of the last decade to introduce market mechanisms in the delivery of care.

As from 1 January 1999 the personal contribution in the Sickness Fund Act (ZFW) is abolished. This personal contribution arranged that people paid 20% of their actual sickness costs, like medicines, themselves as an incentive to keep costs low. There was a maximum of hundred or two hundred guilders per year dependent upon the family-situation. As a consequence of the abolition of the personal contribution the premium for ZFW has increased. The reason for abolishment is that it had no effect on consumption, while leading to high administrative costs.

Waiting lists in the nursing and caring sector

The number of elderly people in the Netherlands is growing (see pensions section in chapter 3). For this, and because people live longer there is more need for care. The demand for care is larger than the supply , however, which created the ‘waiting lists’ problem. For instance, three quarters of home care institutions have long waitinglists, with waiting periods for weeks to months (NZI 1998).

Government has given high priority to this problem and has formulated a new approach, consisting of four elements: (Landelijke Vereniging voor Thuiszorg, 1999).

- extra money for more care-hours

- to carry out a region stimulation program

The implementation of these elements has just taken a start, but an early success is achieved already: the number of patients who are waiting for a heart-operation longer than three months is reduced with 70 percent, also the other waiting lists are decreasing. The government has decided to reserve 130 million guilders extra per year. (Min. VWS, 1999).

The cabinet has proposed that healthcare institutions grant specific healthcare to employees along their normal services. This special care for employees is aimed to cure the employee as fast as possible, so he or she can get back to work. The proposal aims at reducing the costs of sickness payment, and the chance of long-term disability. Institutions may keep the extra revenues of their help to employees, if they spend them on ‘normal’ care. A special code, between the institutions, care insurers and employers/employee organizations should be drawn up to make sure that these new activities will not be at the expenses of the normal care for non-employees. A division in healthcare, one for employees and one for non-employees, is not seen as desirable. An important condition is that the care institution has to guarantee that the waiting lists for normal care is and will stay acceptable and that the information about these waiting lists must be made public.

Modification of the Act of MedicalTests (1997)The goal of this Act is to strengthen the legal status of workers who have to take a medical test. From now on medical tests for people applying for a new job will not only be forbidden in the private sector, but also in the public sector. The aim is to prevent that workers are selected by employers on their (expected) health status. This is seen as necessary because the measures taken in the field of sickness and disability benefits have as a consequence that it is rational for employers not to hire people with health risks (see chapter 1 on activation of disabled people).

Extension of the set of people insured by the Sicknessfund ActThis proposal contains measures which makes it possible for self-employed to be insured under the Sickness Fund Act (ZFW) on the basis of the individual taxable income. This Act wants to tune the premium burden of the self-employed with the premium burden of the employees. Self-employed with a profit lower than DFL 41.200 will be insured according to the sickness insurance (TK 26553, 1998-1999).

Persons-bound budgetsIn 1996 the government introduced the persons-bound budgets. These budgets relate to home care. The essence of this personal budget is to make it possible to buy your own help and devices instead of a pay in kind. The maximum claim for nursing and caring was reduced in 1998 till a maximum of three hours per day. For some people this has severe consequences for their budget.

The previous chapters have shown that Dutch government is actively intervening in the areas of work, social protection and health care, trying to find balances between the needs of employers, employees and citizens, as well as to steer and facilitate future developments. Here we will present a critical analysis of the major measures taken in the various fields.

Evaluating the effect the whole of activation measures thus far has had on unemployment is problematic. It is e.g. difficult to separate it from the effects of other factors, like employment growth due to economic revival or the effect of restructuring social security. Given the fact that at present the number of unemployed still is higher than the level that was regarded as unacceptable in the 1970s (which was 200.000) one could conclude that policies have not been very successful (SCP 1998). On the other hand, since the mid 1980s unemployment has dropped, and the Dutch unemployment rate of about 3% is among the lowest now in the OECD countries. Long-term unemployment, however, still remains as a structural problem, despite all the targeted measures just discussed. Whether the situation would be even worse if the measures would not have been taken is a question that is difficult, if not impossible, to answer. Maybe one could conclude that policies aimed at employment growth (like national wage moderation) have been more successful than those aimed at reducing long-term unemployment.

Evaluations of individual activation measures are plentiful. In a recently published report in which various types of Dutch and foreign measures are compared the conclusion is drawn that those measures aimed at reducing wage costs for employers are most successful in terms of re-inserting unemployed on the regular market of paid labour (NEI 1999). This conclusion is in line with that of an international comparative report issued by the OECD (OECD 1996). The problem of measures creating additional labour is that ultimately they result in a few participants streaming into regular jobs. Once in an additional job there seem to be lack of possibility and motivation to move on. For, another conclusion is that the stream from subsidised to regular jobs is smaller when the subsidy period lasts longer, and when the subsidised jobs are in the public sector.

Administrations that want to show impressing success rates tend to cream their clientele, i.e. concentrate their efforts on those with the highest labour market chances. Creaming in the activation business is a recurrent finding of many evaluation studies. Other typical problems of activation policies are the relatively high administrative costs and, in case of additional labour, the issue whether the jobs created are in effect additional or just pushing away other people’s regular jobs.

Conclusions from a recent critical review of activation policies until 1998 (Van Oorschot 1998) are: 1) Three groups with notoriously bad labour market chances, older unemployed, women and ethnic minorities, are absent as explicit target groups for activation measures;2) Schemes vary in the number of people participating in them. Generally the participation rate, as the percentage of participants relative to the total target group, is very small. For instance, even the ‘larger’ schemes, like Banenpool (23.000 participants) and Melkert I (40.000) and II (20.000) only cover small parts of their target groups of a few hundred thousands of long-term unemployed.

In short, regarding the activation of unemployed people the main conclusion might be that the various programs work, but they are quite costly, and tend to be highly selective. The most difficult groups (long-term unemployed, older unemployed, women, ethnic minorities, lowly educated) are less reached. At present it is still unclear to what degree such groups will profit from the ‘comprehensive approach’.

A second type of societal critique characterises Dutch activation policy as ‘participation neurosis’. It points to the fact that working in itself is stressed by government as a most valuable thing in life, while neglecting the quality of jobs offered, the limits to the ‘employability’ and ‘trainability’ of people, and the strong interference with private life. Among this critique is also the point that government wants to stimulate flexible work patterns on the one hand, but expects beneficiaries to work full-time, so that they can provide fully for themselves.

Dutch government seems to have adopted two different standards: flexible patterns for those who can rely on themselves, full-time work for unemployed.

The evaluation of the activation measures for disabled people and disabled unemployed, which numbers widely exceed that of unemployed people, shows a much more negative picture. In its August-report 1999 the Ctsv, the Dutch national Social Security Supervisory Board, is highly critical. It mentions the following points:

• The privatisation of sickness insurance by WULBZ has resulted initially in a decrease in sickness absenteeism, but from 1998 onwards the figures are mounting again. Due to the increased employment workers might feel more ‘jobsafe’, and stay at home sick more easily. Another factor might be the increased labour participation of women.
• In the last 10 years the percentage of disabled persons who found a job has decreased from 2% to 1,9 %, despite all the measures taken. In the early 1990s, with the introduction of the so-called ‘T-laws’, government stated to aim at an increase to 5%.
• The executive bodies are not able to reduce sickness and disability claims due to their purely ‘administrative’ and ‘bureaucratic’ attitude. Re-integration is not the service they are best in, nor the one they put most energy in.
• If disabled people find a job it is mostly due to their personal efforts, and/or that of their (former) employers, while the role of the executive bodies is very small or absent.
• The instruments for re-integration are not used. Ctsv expects that REA will share the same fate.

Clearly, the incentives for employers not to hire disabled workers or people with weak health, which are implied by PEMBA (premium differentiation according to the number of disability claims a company ‘generates’) and WULBZ (premium differentiation according to the degree of a company’s sickness absenteeism), can not be neutralised by the practices of reintegration. More structurally, the reintegration of disabled persons is not expected to be able to cope with the various factors pushing the disability numbers up again, like: 1) the ageing of the labour force, 2) the increasing labour participation of women, 3) the growth of the total labour force.

To promote equal chances for and treatment of men and women, as well as for utilising the full potential of the Dutch labour force government is developing a series of measures aimed at facilitating people to combine work and care. A Work and Care framework law is under construction, while a number of measures have already been implemented. A critical evaluation is very difficult here, since the substantial parts of the new polices are still in the stage of proposals.

The Social Economic Council (SER) has already reacted to the proposals. This important Dutch socio-economic advisory board agrees with government’s diagnosis that obstacles for combing work and caring tasks are plentiful and should be removed. The equal division of paid and unpaid work between men and women is seen as an important future challenge. SER would want policies in the field to be aimed at creating more choice possibilities for men and women to gain economic independence and to remove obstacles that hinder choices. Furthermore, some proposals are seen by SER as very vague, like the one on long-term unpaid leave.

The social democratic party PvdA criticizes the new proposals of government. The Pvda is very happy with some new proposals, like leave saving and the short-term calamity leave, but it regrets that this short-term leave (10 days) is unpaid. The PvdA had hoped for a better equilibrium between collective and individual responsibility. It fears adverse effects of leave arrangements in which the employer has to bear the full costs: as a consequence employers will not hire as much women. The PvdA wants a collective solution, i.e. a paid leave care the costs of which should be divided equally between employers, employees and government. Like SER the PvdA finds the proposal of a long-term unpaid leave very vague, and the proposals need more clear descriptions about the possibilities to take care of a sick family member.

In parliamentary debates on the Act on Adaptation of Labour Hours (Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur) christian-democrats (CDA) and conservative liberals (VVD) have expressed a negative view on the possibility of employees to demand an upward adjustment of their weekly working hours. Wanting to work more hours is not seen by them as contributing to a fairer division of paid and unpaid work, while the costs for employers could be substantial.

The christian employees union CNV has expressed a positive general reaction to the proposals. Government leaves enough room for social partners to fill in the proposals. However, that the employer has a veto when granting care leave is seen as strange, since on the other hand the proposals try to encourage consultation of all parties. CNV also criticizes the labour obligation of single parents with young children. At this moment there is not enough affordable childcare. First the government has to make sure that there are enough childcare places. Then the government can introduce a labour obligation.

In short, at present Dutch government is working hard on a number of new acts that aim at facilitating and stimulating a more equal division of paid and unpaid work between men and women, as well better combinations of work and care. It feels that it lags behind societal developments. Social partners and political parties agree on principle with the need for measures, but discussion is still there about practicalities.

Generally one might say that the last two years have not been very significant regarding social security legislation as such. Little changed in unemployment insurance and assistance. The measures taken regarding the state pension do not affect present contributions and benefits and (partly because of this) have a high societal legitimacy. Sickness-pay regulation did not change, while the introduction of WAZ and WAJONG had little or no effect on financing and beneficiaries. In the field of disability insurance the differentiation of premiums according to risk by PEMBA is, however, a significant measure, which might influence the labour market chances of disabled people negatively (see critical analysis of activation measures).

At present, except for the execution of social security (see chapter 5), there is no ‘big issue’ in social security under discussion. All schemes have been changed more or less substantially in the last 20 years, and there seem not to exist urgent and pressing circumstances for major changes. The economy is doing well, employment is high, unemployment is low. The number of disability claimants is, however, still very high, and has returned growing again. Government’s attitude at present is to await first the effects of all the measures taken, before considering new measures. It also waits for the execution debate to be solved, since the diagnosis of why the measures seem to show disappointing results points mainly to failures of the administrations involved. The idea is that new policies are useless unless the execution of benefit and reintegration schemes is put into order first. This general idea is also present among social partners.

The relatively high level of flexible and part-time work among the Dutch working population urges for measures improving the social protection of flex-workers. Stimulating possibilities for flexible work-patterns is also seen as a way of meeting employers’ needs for flexible production and service delivery. The Flexibility and Security Act has been implemented for these purposes.

Since this law is very new, it is hard evaluate its pros and cons in detail. Some conclusions may, however, be drawn (see Grijpstra et al, 1999):

- Seen from the perspective of employers, the main conclusion of Grijpstra’s study is that this new act generates significant administrative fuss. This is mainly due to the fact that all kinds of standard procedures have to be changed because of new rules. The Dutch government hopes this will only be a temporary matter. From this point of time, it is too premature to give conclusions whether this is the case.

- 47% of interviewed employers has a negative judgement on the law. Around 30% is positive, whereas around 20% has no opinion on it (yet). Negative aspects include mainly administrative fuss and the necessity to change the collective agreements they made with labour unions. Positive aspects include the clarity of the act and the better approach it gives towards coping with flexible work.

- Seen from the point of view of employees, the conclusions are not very optimistic. Research shows that until now 45,000 people have already had disadvantage(s) from the new act. On the other hand, 80,000 present employees have been advantaged by it. This means that around 35 percent of flex-workers employees is not satisfied with this new act.

Furthermore, labour unions like the national FNV fear mass dismissal of temporary workers who will soon enter phase III of IV. FNV fears that employers do not want them to work for them permanently and therefore dismiss them. This has already happened for a lot of temporary workers at Smith’s Food in Broek op Langedijk. In such cases, the law has the unintended effect of worsening the position of flex-workers. It is unclear yet whether this will be a structural development. Estimates of the FNV give a worst-case scenario of 45,000 temporary workers being dismissed (that is the population of phase III and IV, which is around 15 percent of all temporary workers).

Vlaming (1999)suggests that the Act on Security and Flexibility is a political product, not a product made by lawyers. It is feared that a lot of detailed issues still have to be cleared up in court. This would still be like the old situation, in which a lot of rules were made by jurisprudence. His second main argument against the new act is that almost all rules can be evaded in collective agreements between the social partners. This implies that it is still unclear whether employees and employers will have that much advantages of the new act. It might be feared that all advantages will disappear if negotiations between social partners ask for a compromise.

Finally, a strong argument is set up against the fictitious period of notice. It is feared that because of this fictitious period of notice, a larger sum will be demanded by the employee because he does not receive WW right away. In an example of someone who makes Dfl. 7,500 a month and receives Dfl. 15,000 compensation for dismissal, this person will have to spend his entire compensation, because he receives no WW yet. Only after two months he will get this. The fear is that the employee wants to prevent this and demands more money, which costs the employer more and brings in stress etc. between social partners. This problem can be described as the ‘unemployment insurance-gap’ (WW gat) (Van Hees, 1999).

In short, the Act on Flexibility and Security is only implemented for 6 months. It is unclear whether it will have the effects that policy makers had in mind when writing the act. Some problems have already be made clear by lawyers, who think of it as a political product, that has a lot of legal gaps. On the other hand, most flexible workers seem to be enjoying more rights, although 35 percent of them seem to have some disadvantages.

Regional cooperation between private uvi’s, municipal social services and job centers in CWI’s (Centers for Work and Income, Centrum Werk en Inkomen) is complicated as cooperation and competition are not easy to combine. Perhaps the government should choose between competition or cooperation (SCP 1998).

Government expects that privatisation will stimulate the competition between the uvi’s and that this will lead to a more effective execution. However, up till know there is not a free market with full competition but a quasi market. The agents cannot freely expend or invest their profits. There are high thresholds to enter the market. The Lisv, still the only principal of the uvi=s, decides on the contracts and budgets (Kapteijns 1998, Van der Veen, 1997). Furthermore other problems exist. For example, in the competition for contracts with employers uvi’s will not fine them, if, according to law, they are obliged to do so. A serious problem of conflicting loyalties.

It is clear that the influence of organisations of employers and employees in the execution of the worker’s insurances has decreased since the OSV 1995. However, in the nearby future their influence may increase indirectly as large companies and branches of industries become principals of the uvi’s.

If government wants to continue the way towards privatisation and competition than, as a consequence, it has to regulate the private market and it will have to extend its supervision and control. Second, another consequence can be an increasing non-transparency of the execution as the market gets more complicated. Third, the bureaucracy may also increase because of the created dualism in the execution; after all, more (public and private) institutions are involved in the execution of social insurance- or reintegration-acts (SER 1999/05). Finally, it still is not clear or all the changes in the execution, especially privatisation and competition, contribute to a decline in the number of beneficiaries. In other words, whether privatisation and competition will lead to a more efficient execution in the field of social security.

In the last decades the wish for controlling healthcare costs and quality has lead to many policy measures regarding prices, supply, demand and access to care. In a critical review it is said that the limit of measures is reached (Bekker 1999). Former measures have lead to undesirable side-effects, like budgetmaximalisation behaviour by care institutions and uncontrollability of the whole system. More accumulation of measures is believed to lead to more contradictions and inefficiencies.

In the recent period since 1997 very little has changed with an effect for consumers. Policy debate and measures have mainly been focused on the administration and implementation of care.

This is not to say that nothing happened. The waiting lists problem is put high on the agenda, and measures are proposed, and some already implemented, for tackling the problem. A second major issue has been to offer care institutions the possibility of giving separate care to sick employees. This is a subject raising a strong social debate, since opponents fear the development of a dual care system: a high quality one for employees, and a lesser quality system for non-workers. A code or covenant between actors involved will have to prevent this.

The Social and Economic Council is in favour of separate care for sick employees. It states that the healthcare sector plays a very important role regarding the prevention of absenteeism and disability. The sector is also important for the reintegration of sick and (partial) incapacitated persons. The importance of the healthcare sector has increased since the changes of the Sickness Act (ZW) and Act on Disability Insurance (WAO). Shorter waiting lists, better co-operation between doctors and company doctors and an increase in efficiency of the healthcare can lead to a limitation of sick and incapacitated people.

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AAW Algemene Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet

ABW Algemene Bijstandswet

ANW Algemene Nabestaandenwet

AOW Algemene Ouderdomswet

AWW Algemene Weduwen- en Wezenwet

AWBZ Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten

CBS Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek

CDA Christen Democratisch Appèl

CNV Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond

CPB Centraal Planbureau

CTSV College van Toezicht Sociale Verzekeringen

CWI Centrum voor Werk en Inkomen

EAA Experiment Additionele Arbeid

FBV Federatie van Bedrijfsverenigingen

FNV Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging

GAK Gemeenschappelijk administratiekantoor

GMD Gemeenschappelijke Medische Dienst

I/D Instroom/Doorstroom

IOAW Wet Inkomensvoorziening Oudere en Gedeeltelijk Arbeidsongeschikte Werknemers

JWG Jeugdwerkgarantieplan

LISV Landelijk Instituut Sociale Verzekeringen

NEI Nederlands Economisch Instituut

NZI Nederlands Zorg Instituut

OECD Organisation for Economical Coordination and Development

OSV Organisatiewet Sociale Verzekeringen

PEMBA Premiedifferentiatie En Marktwerking Bij Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekeringen

PVDA Partij van de Arbeid

RBA Regionaal Bestuur Arbeidsvoorziening

RDA Regionaal Directeur Arbeidsvoorzieningenorganisatie

REA Wet op de (Re)integratie van Arbeidsgehandicapten

RWW Rijksgroepsregeling Werkloze Werknemers

SAMEN Wet Stimulering Arbeidsdeelname Minderheden

SCP Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau

SER Sociaal-Economische Raad

STAR Stichting van de Arbeid

SZW (Ministerie van) Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid

SVR Sociale Verzekeringsraad

TICA Tijdelijk instituut voor coördinatie en afstemming

TK Tweede Kamer

TNO Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast-Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek

TV-GWJ Tijdelijke Voorziening Gemeentelijke Werkgelegenheidsinitiatieven voor Jongeren

TW Toeslagenwet

VAT Value Added Tax

VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie

WAADI Wet Allocatie Arbeidskrachten door Intermediairs

WAGW Wet Arbeid Gehandicapte Werknemers

WAJONG Wet Arbeidsongeschiktheidsvoorziening Jonggehandicapten

WAO Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering

WAZ Wet Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering Zelfstandigen

WBEAA Wet Bevordering Evenredige Arbeidsdeelname Allochtonen

WIK Wet Inkomensvoorziening Kunstenaars

WIW Wet Inschakeling Werkzoekenden

WMK Wet op de Medische Keuringen

WSW Wet Sociale Werkvoorziening

WULBZ Wet uitbreiding loondoorbetalingsplicht bij ziekte

WW Werkloosheidswet

WWV Wet Werkloosheidsvoorziening

ZFW Ziekenfondswet

ZW Ziektewet